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Executive Summary 
 
In December 2005, Congress enacted the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone 
Act) to assist in the recovery process from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  This legislation 
allocated extra Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Florida and Texas.  
For this project, researchers assessed LIHTC Program in the GO Zone areas of 
Louisiana and Mississippi to explore the program’s effectiveness and the impact of the extra GO 
Zone Act allocations.  The project consisted of several components: a literature review, 
analyses of the LIHTC Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) database, a 
series of regression analyses, a GIS analysis, face-to-face interviews of stakeholders, telephone 
interviews of builder-developers in Louisiana and Mississippi. 
Literature Review 
 A review of journal articles, government and think tank policy reports and news stories 
allowed researchers to gather information about the LIHTC program, builder-developer decision 
making and the current housing issue resulting from the hurricanes of 2005. Most importantly, 
researchers discovered that there were several methods of estimating housing need (involving 
median income calculations, resident population estimates and housing storm damage 
estimates). Additionally, varying estimates calculated by a number of reputable research 
organizations contribute to, rather than alleviate, the uncertainty about the amount of housing 
need. Further, researchers found that the coastal areas that sustained the most damage from 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita have historically had substantial low income housing needs.  
HUD Database, Regression and GIS Analyses 
Utilizing a HUD data base, a series of tabulations revealed 500 developments 
(consisting of 24,107 units) were built in Louisiana and 451 LIHTC developments (consisting of 
13,970 units) were built in Mississippi between 1986 and 2004. Additionally, GIS maps of the 
same data revealed that, though these developments, are scattered across both states, they are 
heavily concentrated in a few major urban areas. Further, a series of regression analyses, 
reveal a multicollinearity of several factors including ethnicity, education, income involved in the 
decision to place LIHTC development.  
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Coastal County and Parish Case Studies 
  
Utilizing a HUD data base, an additional series of tabulations revealed that there were 
substantial gaps between the amount of housing needed and the amount of LIHTC allocated to 
various parishes and counties, a lack enforcement capability by LIHTC oversight entities, that 
coastal areas that historically received few or no LIHTC units were protesting the building of 
LIHTC units, even though, their damage and destruction estimates suggested they had a 
substantial need for affordable housing. An additional important finding was that a local 
research firm had calculated the cost of mixed income LIHTC units vs. non-mixed income units 
and found that mixed income LIHTC units costs more than non-mixed units. And further, that the 
publication of these findings lead to a reallocation of funding of both types of units and less 
mixed income units In Orleans counties. 
Telephone and Face-to-Face Field Interviews 
 Researchers telephoned both private and nonprofit builder-developers who received a 
state contract to build LIHTC developments and those who did not.  The team also performed 
face to face interviews with LIHTC state and community officials. Their narrative responses to 
questions revealed a number of challenges. First and foremost among these was the need to 
streamline permit offices and secondly to analyze permit application and certificate of 
occupancy data to determine market interest. Additional challenges included the need for 
enhanced enforcement of oversight committees; the need for inclusive zoning policies and 
procedures and the need to coordinate local and state offices.  
Concluding Remarks 
The review of the literature, the data base, GIS and regression analyses, the telephone 
and area face to face interviews suggests:  
 
State housing authorities might consider the following: 
1. Using alternatives to census data to estimate amount of housing units, amount of 
housing need and per capita residency; 
2. Creating a data governance entity which would manage LIHTC distribution and 
interpretation 
3. Creating annual reports which indicate corrective actions taken in response to 
audit/oversight entity recommendations;  
4. Providing incentives to local officials for streamlining their permit office procedures; and 
 
Federal housing authorities might consider the following: 
5. Using permit office archival data (permit applications and certificates of occupancy) to 
determine whether developers build affordable housing without LIHTCs. 
6. Coordinating local, state and federal goals and procedures  
7. Providing incentives to both state and local officials which to help them reduce 
NIMBYism, increase mixed income developments and increase the utilize of inclusive 
zoning; and; 
8. Using the OMB-PART program evaluation methodology to evaluate the LIHTC program 
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Introduction 
 
Housing is generally considered affordable if a household spends less than 30% of their 
income on housing-related costs.1   The federal government enacted the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit (LIHTC) program as an incentive to create affordable housing.  Private builders and 
developers are encouraged to construct affordable housing and the LIHTCs decreases costs of 
that housing by decreasing tax burdens.  State housing finance agencies allocate LIHTCs using 
criteria that align with state affordable housing goals in accordance with federal guidelines and 
“Qualified Allocation Plans.”2 The LIHTC process is described in further detail in subsequent 
sections below. 
 
In the wake of the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the federal government 
increased housing aid to the Gulf Coast by expanding the LIHTC program in the region.  
Legislation was enacted that created an area called the “Gulf Opportunity Zone” (GO Zone), 
which includes coastal areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama and Florida.3  This 
report focuses primarily on LIHTC use in the Louisiana and Mississippi portions of the GO Zone, 
shown in figures the maps on page 35.  
 
This report presents research on the LIHTC program in the GO Zone. Researchers 
sought to gather information about the net gain of affordable rental housing stock using pre and 
post-hurricane housing stock data.  Also, researchers sought to gather information about LIHTC 
allocation to projects at the margin.  Marginal developments would not occur without the tax 
credits. Researchers collected, reviewed, and analyzed data gathered from available literature, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and stakeholders in the LIHTC 
process.  The project had six main components that included (1) a literature review, (2) a 
database analysis (including descriptive, regression, and GIS), (3) county case studies, (4) a 
face-to-face interview analysis, (5) a telephone survey analysis, and (6) a policy option 
discussion.  The literature review, face-to-face interviews and telephone surveys sought to 
answer portions of each of the research questions, while the database analysis provided insight 
about the LIHTC housing inventory prior to Katrina. Limitations on data prevent clear, definitive 
answers to the research questions.  
 
 The literature review examined affordable housing information to gain an understanding 
of the impact of the LIHTC program and GO Zone funding on affordable housing in the region.  
The most important discovery was that several inconsistent estimates of housing damage based 
upon varying estimation methods exist.  Another important finding was that the coastal localities 
that sustained the most damage from Hurricane Katrina and Rita historically experienced 
housing cost burdens. This illuminates a historical need for the LIHTC program in the GO Zone 
region.   
 
                                                
1 "The Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983." Public Law 98-18.  
2Jackson, Pamela J. "The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A Framework for Evaluation." Congressional Research Service 
(Congressional Research Service), 2007b. 
3 Jackson, Pamela J. "An Introduction to the Design of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit." Congressional Research Service, 
March 2007a 
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Data analyses built upon the literature review by providing insight about the placement 
and characteristics of LIHTC developments prior to hurricane Katrina and analyses revealed 
there were concentrations of LIHTC developments in metropolitan areas and along interstate 
corridors and multicollinearity of education, income and housing quality suggested that no one 
variable determines the placement of LIHTC. 
 
A review of selected coastal parishes in Louisiana and coastal counties in Mississippi 
revealed from 1986 – 2004 revealed that historically, some areas have received substantial 
amounts of units and others have either receive none or very few, The literature also indicated 
that areas with relatively small amounts have protested the building of LIHTC units post-Katrina 
even though they have a considerable need for affordable housing. Further the literature 
reviewed revealed that mixed income units cost more than non-mixed income units and that 
though useful in meeting federal goals of segregation, communities had protested their 
implementation. 
 
 Telephone surveys of builders and developers as well as face to face field interviews 
with housing authorities an community officials suggested that streamlining permit office 
procedures, financial technicalities “deep” affordability (for the lowest income levels), and code 
enforcement were challenges faced by the  LIHTC program. 
 
 The report concludes that the LIHTC program has not been reviewed by the federal 
Office of Management and Budget and that of the housing programs reviewed, the tenant-based 
housing voucher program was rated highest in terms of effectiveness.  
 
Prior to discussing research findings, it is important to first understand how the LIHTC 
program works.  The LIHTC program reduces the future tax burden for approved builders and 
developers, but does not directly provide funds for immediate use.  To create operating capital, 
successful applicants generally sell the tax credits to investors.  The transaction may occur 
directly with investors or indirectly with syndicators.  Investors that buy tax credits generally 
create a limited partnership company with the developer.  The builder or developer retains a 
small ownership percentage in exchange for operating capital.  On the other hand, syndicators 
exist solely to administer tax credit transactions.  The role of syndicators in LIHTC deals has 
decreased in prominence in recent years.4  In addition to selling the credits, builders and 
developers may seek supplemental funding through traditional loans, grants and/or subsidies.5  
 
 To understand the use of GO Zone LIHTCs, it is helpful to first comprehend the process 
used to allocate tax credits. First, Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) set the per 
capita credit amount and population figures used to calculate state credit authority.6  State 
housing finance agencies draft Qualified Allocation Plans (QAPs) to apportion LIHTCs 
according to state goals.   
 
                                                
4 (Jackson  2007b) 
5 (Jackson 2007a) 
6 Wilson, Christopher J., and Timothy L. Jones. "Notice 2008-22. 2008 Calendar Year Resident Population Estimates." Novoco. 
February 27, 2008. http://www.novoco.com/low_income_housing/resource_files/irs_rulings/irs_notices/notice_08-22.pdf 
(accessed 9 2008, March). 
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Using a competitive point system, QAPs encourage developments to align with the 
state’s priorities within federally prescribed guidelines (see Figure 1).  According to federal law, 
the QAP must prioritize developments which serve the lowest-income households for the 
longest period of time.7 
 
After the state housing finance agency publishes the QAP, interested builders and 
developers apply for LIHTCs.  Applicants draft a plan based around the state’s QAP point 
system and a required market study prior to submission.8  
 
 Successful applicants must also contend with local city, county or parish authorities for 
permitting, zoning, and public comment before breaking ground.  Developments then move 
forward to the construction and compliance phases.  Once the local government jurisdiction 
approves the development for occupancy, the developer must meet basic requirements of the 
LIHTC program to claim the tax credits.  LIHTC basic requirements include: 
 
 a minimum percentage of units “set aside” for low-income tenants,  
 a maximum level of rent,  
 compliance with the agreed upon time period (up to 30 years, depending on the 
approved application), and 
 compliance with resale requirements that limit the sale of the development to a buyer 
that will uphold the low rent status of the units for the duration of the agreement.9  
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review. "A Review of the Mississippi Home Corporation's 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program." Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review, 
2006. 
9 Cunningham, Helena R. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program and HOME Affordable Housing Program. Owners Compliance 
Manual. Baton Rouge: Louisiana Housing Finance Agency, 2001. 
Figure 1: LIHTC Process 
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The Literature Review 
 
Before engaging in field research, the research team conducted a literature review.  This 
review facilitated an understanding of background and context information of the LIHTC 
program in the GO Zone. 
Methodology 
Researchers reviewed the LIHTC program literature, hurricane damage and recovery 
literature and then constructed a spreadsheet of relevant findings and implications and the 
following section presents these. 
Findings  
The most important discovery was that several inconsistent estimates of housing 
damage exist.  Another important finding was that the coastal localities that sustained the most 
damage from Hurricane Katrina and Rita had historically experienced low income housing 
needs and housing cost burdens. 
 
Builder-Developer Decision-Making 
 
One key aspect of the LIHTC process includes the decision-making criteria used by 
developers when deciding to enter the LIHTC market.  Etter (1995) asserted that companies 
base such decisions upon four “cornerstones” of real estate investment, which includes 
analyses of market support, financial feasibility, after tax return to equity and value-to-cost 
comparisons.10  Value-to-cost comparisons lead to an economic tradeoff between physical and 
financial factors.  This paradigm ignores socio-political factors, which can substantially affect 
builder-developer decision-making. 
 
Market support is a function of need and location.11  Sufficient need and available 
location must exist for a developer to enter the LIHTC market.  Need and location are discussed 
in more detail later in this report.   
 
The next criterion includes financial feasibility analysis, which questions the project’s 
potential income generation in consideration of its costs.12  LIHTC projects may not appeal to 
developers if rental income does not produce a profit.  The LIHTC provides equity for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Etter, Wayne E. Investment by Design: A Primer in Real Estate Analysis. College Station, TX: Real Estate Center, 1995. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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developers to leverage against construction costs, which is critical for the project to 
move forward.   
 
Similar to the concept of financial feasibility, after tax return to equity analyzes the 
expected cash flow and investment appreciation against property purchase expenses to 
determine profit.13  Predicting cash flow is difficult because real estate investment inherently 
involves risk.  Business, management, financial, political, inflation, liquidity and interest rate 
risks create unknown hurdles for the project.  Table 1 presents descriptions of each of these 
types of risk, which are re-visited in the telephone and face-to-face studies later in this report.  
 
The final cornerstone in the analysis involves value-to-cost comparisons.  Value, or 
“present value of all the cash benefits expected by the equity investor,” should exceed costs for 
a developer to consider building the project.14  Projects thus face a trade-off between physical 
and financial dimensions; attractive physical building characteristics require capital outlay to 
attract cash flow, but high costs decrease a project’s financial attractiveness.15  
 
This economic tradeoff lacks an important perspective on real estate decision-making: 
social factors also affect real estate development feasibility.  Social factors seek to maximize the 
community’s acceptance.16  In the GO Zone, an interdisciplinary committee drafted The 
People’s Plan for Overcoming the Hurricane Katrina Blues, which indicated that a large 
percentage of the low-income housing in the Lower 9th Ward would need to be rebuilt.17  
Although this area directly borders St. Bernard Parish, the face-to-face study revealed that local 
government officials deny the need for affordable housing in the parish.   The balance of such 
tensions creates the social factor in real estate development feasibility.  Figure 2 represents the 
interaction between the social, physical and financial aspects of real estate development 
feasibility. 
 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Leelarasamee, Yosaporn. "A Decision Support System for Income-Producing Real Estate Development Feasibility Analysis and 
Alternative Assessment." May 2005.  
16 Leelarasamee, Yosaporn. "Property Development (Financial) Feasibility Study." Department of Housing, Faculty of Achitecture, 
Chulalongkorn University, 2003. 
17 Acorn Housing University Partnership, Cornell University, and Columbia University. "The People's Plan for Overcoming the 
Hurricane Katrina Blues." New Orleans, 2007.  
Table 1: Real Estate Investment Risks 
Risk Description 
Business The property may fail to generate adequate cash flow. 
Management The property managers may fail to respond properly to changes in the 
business environment and, therefore, fail earn a satisfactory return. 
Financial The property will have inadequate income to meet debt service requirements. 
Political A government action adversely affects the property or the investor. 
Inflation Cash benefits received in the future will have less purchasing power than an 
equal benefit received today. 
Liquidity A property cannot be sold quickly without loss or large selling expenses. 
Interest Rate The property’s value will decrease because of increased interest rate. 
Source: Etter (1995) 
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The builder-developer decision-making model is evident in the LIHTC market response 
after Hurricane Katrina.  Investors from across the country have flocked to Biloxi and Gulfport, 
Mississippi because of GO Zone act incentives.  The economic development has driven a need 
for rental housing in addition to pre-Katrina levels to support an expanding workforce.  Also, 
insurance costs have pushed affordable housing development inland despite the overwhelming 
need for rental housing on the coast.  Louisiana also faces challenges.  Baton Rouge absorbed 
a remarkable displacement of New Orleans residents, which expanded a pre-existing stable 
rental market aft the storms.  However, other areas in Louisiana (particularly New Orleans) must 
overcome obstacles to develop; local politics have stifled development.18  
State Housing Finance Agency Decision-Making 
 State housing finance agency decision-making is another important component of the 
LIHTC process.  Agencies may base GO Zone decisions upon historical successes with the 
LIHTC program.  Historical use of the LIHTC Program was analyzed at the national level and 
then the Louisiana and Mississippi LIHTC Programs were analyzed.  Additional analyses 
revealed variations in LIHTC allocations at the county and parish levels. 
 
The LIHTC Program accounted for an average of 76,440 affordable housing units placed 
in service annually from 1987 to 2005.  The LIHTC program produced 27,157 developments, 
consisting of 1,375,927 units during these eighteen years.19 . 
 
Louisiana and Mississippi used the LIHTC program to create low-income housing prior 
to Hurricane Katrina.  The LIHTC program accounted for a higher share of the total building 
                                                
18 Smith, Elizabeth. Investing in the GO Zone. June 1, 2007. http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/articles/the-go-zone-51084.aspx 
(accessed February 21, 2008). 
19 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Policy Development and Research. LIHTC Database Access. 2005. 
http://lihtc.huduser.org/ (accessed March 9, 2008). 
Figure 2: Real Estate Development Feasibility 
 
Based upon Leelarasamee (2003) 
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permits in Louisiana and Mississippi than in other states between 1987 and 2001.20  The LIHTC 
program accounted for 21% of the total building permits in Louisiana and 15% of the permits in 
Mississippi for this time period (see Table 2).  Most states tended to rely less on the program, as 
the national average was estimated to be 7%.21   
 
Table 2 presents the number of LIHTC units placed in service for Louisiana and 
Mississippi.  Developments Louisiana and Mississippi accounted for 1.79% and 1.09% 
(respectively) of the total LIHTC units placed in service across the nation until 2005.  These 
states had a smaller concentration of LIHTC units in comparison with other Gulf Coast states, 
but the concentrations in Louisiana and Mississippi were close to the national average.22   Since 
2005, Louisiana and Mississippi have increased involvement in the LIHTC program because of 
the increased GO Zone LIHTC provisions. 
 
 
 
 Due to Louisiana and Mississippi’s involvement in the LIHTC program, it is important to 
examine how the program serves low-income constituents in Louisiana and Mississippi.  The 
LIHTC program serves households living within 50% and 60% of the area median income 
(AMI).23  Figure 3 depicts the households in Louisiana and Mississippi with 0-50% AMI that 
experienced a housing cost burden according to the 2000 Census by county or parish.24  A 
household experiences cost burden if housing costs exceed 35% of the household’s income.25  
Households at this income level in coastal counties and parishes that sustained the highest 
levels of damage from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita experienced cost burdens prior to the storms 
(see tables 3 and 4).   
 
 
 
                                                
20 This information is based upon a 2002 study, so this was the most up-to-date data available to the research team at the time that 
the report was written.  Future research regarding permitting processes is discussed below. This study could update the permit 
figures presented in Table 2. 
21 Malpezzi, Stephen, and Kerry Vandell. Does the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Increase the Supply of Housing? Madison: 
Center for Urban Land Economics Research, School of Business, The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2002. 
22 This is the most recent information according to the HUDUSER database.  The numbers presented in the next section were the 
most recent information at the time that the database analysis was performed.  The database analysis contains information up to 
2004. 
23 (Jackson 2007a) 
24 Data for 0-60% AMI was not readily available.   
25 The Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 
Table 2: LIHTC Share of Total Permits (1987-2001) and LIHTC Units Placed in Service 
(1987-2005) by Selected States 
State 
LIHTC Share of 
Total Permits 
Total LIHTC Units 
in the State 
Percentage of National 
LIHTC Units 
Louisiana 21% 24,685 1.79% 
Mississippi 15% 14,957 1.09% 
Alabama 9% 25,633 1.86% 
Texas 10% 126,013 9.16% 
Florida 3% 114,262 8.30% 
National Average 7% 26,460 1.92% 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Policy Development and Research 2008; 
Malpezzi and Vandell (2002). 
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 Pre-Katrina LIHTCs tended to be located the GO Zone counties with the highest 
percentages of residents experiencing cost burdens.  Orleans Parish and Hinds County had the 
highest percentage of households at 50% AMI experiencing housing cost burdens in 2000 and 
also had the largest number of LIHTC units in the coastal area.  It is important to note that 
although households with 0-50% AMI in St. Bernard Parish, Plaquemines Parish and Hancock 
County experienced housing cost burdens, these localities did not historically have many LIHTC 
units.   
 
Post-Katrina and Rita, GO Zone LIHTC credit allocations generally followed historical 
trends in terms of emphasis by parish.  Hinds and Harrison counties deviated from this trend, as 
the Mississippi Home Corporation allocated more GO Zone credits to Harrison than Hinds. 
Finally, if the funded developments are placed in service, the GO Zone Act will have tripled 
LIHTC units in some areas.   
 
Figure 3: Households 0-50% AMI Experiencing Housing Cost Burdens (U.S. Census 2000)26 
 
                                                
26 DataPlace. Map of Hhlds. with Income 0 to 50% of area median with hsg. cost burden in 2000. 
http://www.dataplace.org/map/index.html?cid=22852&centerX=-9873076.267467&centerY=3752695.573137&zoomlevel=11 
(accessed April 24, 2008) 
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Table 3: Households 0-50% AMI Experiencing Housing Cost Burden and Number of LIHTC Units 
for Select Louisiana Parishes27 
Parish Cost-Burdened Households in 1999 
(number, percentage of parish)  
Number of LIHTC 
Units Pre-Katrina 
Number of LIHTC 
Units Post-Katrina 
Orleans 44,905 (23.84%) 3,091 9,157 
Jefferson 25,184 (14.27%) 1,442 1,227 
St. Tammany 7,382 (10.66%) 282 802 
St. Bernard 3,159 (12.60%) 32 0 
Plaquemines 1,072 (11.91%) 0 0 
Table 4: Households 0-50% AMI Experiencing Housing Cost Burden and Number of LIHTC Units 
for Select Mississippi Counties28 
County Cost-Burdened Households in 1999 
(number, percentage of parish) 
Number of LIHTC 
Units Pre-Katrina 
Number of LIHTC 
Units Post-Katrina 
Hinds 16,980 (18.64%) 4,418 1,552 
Harrison 10,579 (14.77%) 866 3,380 
Jackson 5,901 (12.36%) 370 1,039 
Hancock 2,293 (13.57%) 48 937 
 
Estimates of Need 
  
Census Bureau information suggests that nation-wide housing affordability gap has 
grown as more families have become burdened by housing costs.  Rental housing costs 
burdened 38.3% of America’s households in 2000 and 45.8% in 2005.29   
 
Census data indicate that the Gulf Regions of Louisiana and Mississippi had smaller, but 
nonetheless noteworthy percentage of rental cost-burdened families prior to Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005.  An estimated 41-42% of the families living in these states were burdened by rental 
costs prior to the hurricane (see Table 5).30   Potentially more households experienced a need 
for affordable housing, as the Census Bureau figures do not include the portion of the 
population that spends 30-34% of their household income on rent.   
 
                                                
27 KnowledgePlex. DataPlace: Chart of Total Households and Hhlds. with Income 0 to 50% of area median with hsg cost burden in 
2000 in various places. 2008. http://www.dataplace.org/charttable/?rm_cid=21729 (accessed April 24, 2008); HUD Database 
provided by CRS; Bureau of Government Research. Public Investment, Private Development. How Louisiana Employed Its GO 
Zone Housing Tax Credits. New Orleans: Bureau of Government Research, 2007. 
28 DataPlace. Map of Hhlds. with Income 0 to 50% of area median with hsg. cost burden in 2000. 
http://www.dataplace.org/map/index.html?cid=22852&centerX=-9873076.267467&centerY=3752695.573137&zoomlevel=11 
(accessed April 24, 2008) (Mississippi Home Corporation 2008); HUD Database provided by CRS 
29 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005b); U.S. Census Bureau ACS: 2000 C2SS Tabular Profile for United States -- Table 4. 2000a. 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Products/Profiles/Single/2000/C2SS/Tabular/010/01000US4.htm (accessed February 21, 2008). 
30 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005a) 
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 Affordable housing need skyrocketed in the areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita; the storms reduced the number of available affordable housing units. Need created by a 
loss of available housing units may be partially offset by concomitant population reductions.  
Several sources provide a range of inconsistent damage and population change estimates, 
which complicate quantification of need. 
 
Population Change Estimates 
The storms displaced many people in addition to affecting the housing stock.  It is 
difficult, however, to determine and track the exact population change.  Census Bureau data is 
the primary instrument used for measuring state population data, but the public information does 
not typically cover intrastate migration.  The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program 
studied the Census findings and was able to obtain data to provide insight about the immediate 
effects on the area’s population (see Table 6).  Orleans and St. Bernard parishes lost the most 
residents immediately after the storm.  Harrison and Hancock counties also lost the residents 
immediately after the storm.  Houston and Baton Rouge absorbed a portion of these evacuees.   
 
 
The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center uses postal statistics to track 
population changes (see Table 7).  The postal statistics indicate that the population change in 
the New Orleans area varies by parish, and about 14% of the population did not permanently 
 
Table 6: Hurricane Katrina and Rita’s Immediate Affect on the Gulf Area Population Change 
Parish or County Metropolitan Area Numeric Change Percent Change 
Orleans Parish New Orleans, LA -278,833 -63.8% 
St. Bernard Parish New Orleans, LA -61,215 -94.8% 
Jefferson Parish New Orleans, LA -37,273 -8.3% 
Harrison County Gulfport-Biloxi, MS -30,713 -16.5% 
Hancock County Gulfport-Biloxi, MS -11,111 -24.0% 
Plaquemines Parish New Orleans, LA -8,118 -28.7% 
Jackson County Pascagoula, MS -7,938 -5.9% 
Calcasieu Parish Lake Charles, LA -6,070 -3.4% 
Mobile Parish Mobile, LA -2,334 -0.6% 
Cameron Parish Lake Charles, LA -1,961 -20.7% 
 Houston, TX 130,029 2.5% 
 Baton Rouge, LA 26,727 3.8% 
Table 5: The Pre-Katrina Rent Burden  
Rent-Burdened Households 
Number Percentage 
Nation 16,841,409 45.8% 
Louisiana 216,833 41.3% 
Mississippi 127,122 41.8% 
Source: (U.S. Census Bureau 2005a); (U.S. Census Bureau 2005b)
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return by August 2007.  The population level in St. Bernard and Orleans parishes remain a 
fraction of the pre-hurricane count.  Populations in St. Charles, St. John and St. Tammany 
parishes have grown since the hurricanes.  Generally these studies focus on local patterns and 
do not provide much insight to the changes in and around the state.  Without a clear 
determination of the population changes, developers may be hesitant to rebuild and state 
housing financing agencies may struggle with generating a rationale for allocating tax credits. 
 
 
  
Table 7: New Orleans Area Residences Actively Receiving Mail 
  July 2005 August 2006 August 2007 
Parish Numeric Percent Numeric Percent Numeric Percent 
Orleans 198,232 100% 98,141 49.50% 137,082 69.20%
Jefferson 187,612 100% 183,308 97.70% 184,165 98.20%
St. Bernard 25,604 100% -- -- 10,098 39.40%
St. Charles 14,847 100% 15,160 102.10% 15,501 104.40%
St. John 14,555 100% 14,979 102.90% 15,408 105.90%
St. Tammany 83,467 100% 84,226 100.90% 86,614 103.80%
6-Parish Area 524,317 100% 406,690 77.60% 448,868 85.60%
Source: (Plyer 2008)  
21 
 
Housing Damage Estimates  
 
Existing literature presents a range of estimates for housing units impacted by the 
hurricanes (see Table 8). Ranges differ on several aspects.  First, the estimates use different 
terminology to quantify the effect of the hurricanes on the housing stock.  Some studies used 
“damaged” and “destroyed,” while others used “affected.”  Each of these terms means different 
things. “Damaged” means that a structure sustained partial, potentially repairable destruction.  
On the other hand, “destroyed” means that a structure sustained irreparable damage.  
“Affected” could encompass both “damaged” and “destroyed” in addition to mere contact with 
the storms.  Second, the data estimates range in geographical scope by including information 
specific to New Orleans, the Mississippi Coast or combinations of the states impacted with the 
hurricanes.  Third, the authors also differed by including one or both of the hurricanes.   
 
Finally, some sources estimated numbers using first-hand information, while others 
referred to existing sources.  Table 9 presents four secondhand estimates based upon the 
FEMA et al. (2006) estimate.  As shown, the estimates range from 82,000 to 204,737 housing 
units impacted by the storms.  The estimates vary because the sources excluded information 
based upon the scope of their research. 
 
The varied nature of the estimates presents a challenge to the LIHTC program.  Without 
consensus on how much the rental stock was impacted by the storms, state housing financing 
agencies likely struggle with generating a rationale for allocating tax credits. 
Table 8: Selected Post-Hurricane Housing Damage Estimates 
Author/Source Storm Location Firsthand? Assessment 
RAND - Bernstein et al.(2006) Katrina  Mississippi Yes. 134,000 homes damaged 
65,000 homes destroyed 
The Urban Institute - Austin 
Turner and Zedlewski (2006) 
Katrina New Orleans Yes. A majority of the housing 
destroyed 
FEMA - Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (2007) 
Rita Texas and 
Louisiana 
Yes. 16,246 households lived in 
were in temporary housing 
after the storm 
CRS - Gabe, Falk, McCarty 
and Mason (2005) 
Katrina  Louisiana, 
Mississippi 
and Alabama  
No. 
Source: 
American 
Red Cross. 
278,000 home owners affected 
885,791 structures affected  
68,729 dwellings destroyed in 
Mississippi  
Brookings – Liu, Fellows and 
Mabanta (2006) 
Katrina New Orleans No. 
Source: 
DHS.31 
160,000 homes and 
apartments destroyed or 
majorly damaged  
RAND - McCarty and Hanson 
(2007) 
Katrina Mississippi 
Coast 
No. 
Source: 
FEMA. 
81,000 units exposed to 
flooding and/or storm surge  
GAO - Czerwinski (2007) Katrina  Louisiana, 
Mississippi 
and Alabama 
No. 
Source: 
DHS.32 
Over 300,000 homes 
destroyed and 300,000 homes 
damaged (Source: DHS) 
FEMA - Federal Emergency 
Management Agency  et al. 
(2006) 
Katrina 
and 
Rita 
Louisiana and 
Mississippi 
Yes. 735,593 units damaged or 
destroyed 
                                                
31 Department of Homeland Security 
32 Department of Homeland Security 
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Table 9: Post-Hurricane Housing Damage Estimates Based on FEMA et al. (2006) 
Author/Source Location Assessment 
BGR - Bureau of Government 
Research (2007) 
Louisiana 82,000 units “destroyed or badly damaged”  
PolicyLink – Clark and Rose 
(2007) 
Louisiana 82,145 rental units lost in the hurricanes 
(including major or severely damaged units) 
Brookings - Liu (2006) New Orleans 204,700 homes and rental units majorly or 
severely damaged 
GCR & Associates, Inc. 
(2008) 
Louisiana 204,737 homes received major or severe 
damage 
 
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency et al. (FEMA 2006) estimate addresses 
both storms in Louisiana and Mississippi, which corresponds with the scope of this report.  
Therefore, the FEMA estimate has been chosen to represent the level of damage and 
destruction that the Louisiana and Mississippi rental housing stock sustained in subsequent 
analyses. 
 
 The FEMA et. al (2006) estimate indicates that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita substantially 
affected the rental stock in Louisiana and Mississippi (see Table 10).  An estimated 41% of the 
total rental stock in the Gulf Region was damaged or destroyed.  Louisiana sustained a greater 
impact than Mississippi; Katrina and Rita damaged or destroyed approximately 14% more units 
in Louisiana than in Mississippi.  While these figures account for all of the rental stock (i.e. all 
rental units, not solely affordable units), a substantial portion of the damaged or destroyed units 
likely affected the affordable housing market.  The lack of rental housing increased rental prices 
in both states after the storm,33 creating an even deeper affordable housing need. 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Liu, Amy, and Allison Plyer. The New Orleans Index: Second Anniversary Special Edition. The Brookings Institution Metropolitan 
Policy Program and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2007. 
Table 10: Post Hurricane Louisiana and Mississippi Rental Damage and Destruction 
Rental Units 
Prior to the 
Storm* 
Units Damaged 
or Destroyed 
Percentage 
Lost 
Louisiana 398,288 184,179 46.24%
Mississippi 197,188 62,470 31.68%
Total 595,476 246,649 41.42%
* Pre-storm rental unit estimates include only the areas designated as eligible for Federal Emergency Management Agency assistance. 
Source: (Federal Emergency Management Agency, Small Business Association, The Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf 
Coast Rebuilding, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2006); (U.S. Census Bureau 2005a) 
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Summary 
The literature review highlighted the importance of community acceptance for calculating 
developer interest in the LIHTC market.  It also revealed that state housing finance agencies 
tended to allocate LIHTCs to coastal parishes with households experiencing housing cost 
burdens before and after the storms.  GO Zone allocations also considered hurricane damage. 
Finally, the most important finding was that multiple inconsistent population and housing 
damage statistics could create a challenge for both federal and state housing agencies which 
allocate LIHTC credits. 
 
State housing authorities can use one of three estimates to arrive at statistics on the 
amount of their resident populations and their associated housing.  
 
1. Estimates based of the number of residents who spend 30% of their income on housing 
(provided by the 2000 census data); 
 
2. Estimates based of the number of people that reside in the state (provided by the 2000 
census data);  
 
3. Estimates of the number of residents that have returned and currently reside in the area 
(provided by the post office and utility statistics);  
 
4. Estimates of the amount of housing need based on the amounts of damage/destruction 
of affordable housing  (provided by research entities e.g., Rand); 
 
5. Estimates of the amount of housing need provided by non-governmental research 
entities).  
 
The first two methods that housing authorities can use to estimate a respective states’ 
population and housing inventory rely on census data.  The U.S. Census is performed every ten 
years through the use of both long and short questionnaire forms and the American Home 
Survey.  One criticism of the U.S. Census is that it has never been able to count every individual 
or home structure, leading to concerns about data accuracy.  
 
Continuous census measurements such as the American Community Survey could 
improve upon the Census data.  The survey is performed annually using sampling techniques 
that contain a calculated amount of error.  The recognized amount of error grows substantially in 
areas where the population fluctuates significantly such as in college towns, border towns and 
locations that sustain catastrophes.   
Because of the increased error in sampling due to the population fluctuation in Louisiana 
and Mississippi after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, alternatives to the ACS have been used. 
Some entities have used monthly statistical samples of post office delivery to residents and 
block by block counts of housing units.34  However, comparisons of the amount of error 
associated with these methods was not located. 
                                                
34  (Edmonston 2001) 
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HUD Database Analyses 
 
The literature review provided partial information about the amount of rental housing.  
The database analysis provided information specific to the LIHTC program, which can be used 
as a baseline of measurement for the research project.  According to the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) database used for the project, the Louisiana GO Zone 
contained 500 LIHTC developments containing 24,107 LIHTC units by 2004.  The Mississippi 
GO Zone contained 451 LIHTC developments containing 13,970 LIHTC units for the same time 
period.   
 
The database analyses provided further information about LIHTC development 
characteristics, which may be useful for housing authorities when determining affordable 
housing goals. 
Methodology 
The HUD database consisted of Louisiana and Mississippi LIHTC development 
characteristics for units constructed between 1984 and 2004.  The database included developer 
information, physical characteristics, and financial characteristics.  Analysts on this project 
summarized and examined the database, beginning with a separation of data by state.  
Researchers supplemented the data by adding variables.  Next, calculations and charts were 
generated and a geographic information systems (GIS) study created maps for analysis. 
 
For all tables and graphs in this section, unless otherwise noted, data is derived from the 
HUD database. 
Findings 
 While the database analyses helped researchers better understand the LIHTC program 
in Louisiana and Mississippi, it also served to create a baseline from which to make 
assessments.  Research centered upon determining the level of involvement of both states in 
the LIHTC program and physical and other selected characteristics of pre-Katrina GO Zone 
LIHTC developments were also analyzed.   
One important finding through the GIS and regression analysis included the location of 
LIHTC developments.  GIS analysis showed that developers tend to locate LIHTC projects in 
metropolitan areas. Specific indicators of placement include community education, income and 
housing quality.  The table below shows the answer to four major research questions.  Data 
indicates that the LIHTC housing stock in Louisiana and Mississippi shrunk after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita.  
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Table 11: Data Summary of LIHTC Housing Units 
 
Units Before Hurricanes Units Damaged by Hurricanes Units After Hurricanes Net Unit Change
LA MS LA MS LA MS LA MS
24,107 13,907 12,378 2,448 11,729 11,459
* * ** *** ^ ^  
 
* HUD database provided to Capstone by CRS (program inception to 2004) 
** BGR report (NEED BETTER CITATION) 
*** Database provided to Capstone by CRS (2006 LIHTC allocations) 
^ Calculated by subtracting “units before” from “units after” 
^^ FEMA et al. (2006) damage estimates for rental housing stock 
LIHTC Program Level of Involvement 
 
The database analysis provided information about the level of program involvement in 
Louisiana and Mississippi.  Neither state was involved during the first year of the LIHTC 
program (see Figure 4 and Table 12).  Louisiana became involved during the second year, while 
Mississippi became involved during the fourth year.   
 
Louisiana tended to place more developments in service than Mississippi. Developers 
averaged about 11 more projects placed in service annually in Louisiana than in Mississippi.  
However, the number of projects placed in service each year varied on a downward trend.  One 
notable exception to this trend occurred in Louisiana in 2001, where the number of LIHTC 
developments spiked to 52.    
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Figure 4: LIHTC Developments by Year 
 
 
Table 12: LIHTC Developments by Year 
 
 
Table 13: LIHTC Units by Year 
Year 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
LA 0 890 1353 2514 1901 853 1138 1676 839 1753
MS 0 0 0 0 226 1123 757 80 1936 1303
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 Avg Total
1955 1752 1177 1624 1208 2187 724 563 0 1291.7 12917
879 1027 257 1076 1267 751 195 1375 918 542.5 5425
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LIHTC program requirements require developers to place units in service prior to filing a 
claim for allocated tax credits. Developers typically sell tax credits to investors, who can claim 
the credits over a 10 year period.  In exchange for the tax credits, investors provide equity to 
finance the project.35  Figure 6 shows the credits claimed annually.  The year the credits were 
claimed is essentially analogous to approval, whereas year “placed in service” occurs when the 
project is ready to house residents.  Figure 5 indicates that the number of credits claimed has 
decreased since the late 1980s, on average.   
Figure 5: Credits Claimed by Year 
 
Table 14: Credits Claimed by Year 
Year 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 Avg Total
LA 0 33 48 43 43 40 14 43 29 24 24 32 17 44 47 12 3 4 0 26.3 500
MS 0 0 59 90 29 39 21 36 33 23 23 22 19 18 7 7 17 7 1 23.7 451  
 
 
                                                
35  (Jackson 2007b) 
28 
 
Developers responsible for the LIHTC projects in Louisiana and Mississippi consisted of a 
relatively small pool before and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Prior to 2005, 26 contractors 
built LIHTC developments in Mississippi and 37 contractors built LIHTC developments in 
Louisiana (see Table 15).  The number of contractors in Mississippi expanded by 8 after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Conversely, the number of contractors in Louisiana shrunk by 2 
after the storms. 
 
Also, a small number of developers continued building after the storm, indicating a high 
level of turnover. These are builders who have both built units before the storm, and after the 
storm.  The percentage of contractors who continued building after the storm was higher in 
Mississippi than in Louisiana.  Five (5) developers in Mississippi and 3 developers in Louisiana 
continued building after the storm.   
Table 15: Contractors Before and After the Hurricanes36 
Characteristic Mississippi Louisiana 
Contractors: 2000-2004 26 37 
Contractors After Hurricanes* 34 35 
Pre-Hurricane Contractors 
Present After the Hurricanes 5 (19.23%) 3 (8.11%) 
   
LIHTC Development Physical Characteristics 
 
 Of the developments built from 1986 to 2004, both Louisiana and Mississippi relied more 
heavily upon new construction than rehabilitative construction in the LIHTC program (see 
Figures 6 and 7 and Table 16).  New construction accounted for 60% of the developments in 
Louisiana and 63% in Mississippi.  This finding is similar to the national trend. 
Figure 6: Louisiana Construction Type Figure 7: Mississippi Construction Type 
  
                                                
36 Numbers derived from the HUD database, LHFA and MHC allocation reports. 
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Table 16: LIHTC Development Construction Type37 
 
Location Construction Type Developments Percentage
Louisiana New 295                     60%
Rehab 205                     40%
Mississippi New 176                     63%
Rehab 103                     37%
Nation New 6,660                  63%
Rehab 3,759                  36%  
 
 Louisiana and Mississippi differed on the average number of bedrooms included in 
LIHTC units.  Louisiana tended to cater to smaller families than Mississippi.  LIHTC units in 
Louisiana consisted of 1.83 bedrooms on average, which compares to 2.10 in Mississippi and 
1.93 nationwide (see Figure 8, Figure 9 and Table 17).  Seventy-eight percent (78%) of the 
LIHTC units in Louisiana had one or two bedrooms in comparison to 71% in Mississippi.  
Mississippi built more two and three bedroom units than Louisiana, proportionately.   
Figure 8: Number of Bedrooms in Louisiana LIHTC Units 
 
Figure 9: Number of Bedrooms in Mississippi LIHTC Units 
 
                                                
37 National data from U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1st Quarter 2005. U.S. Housing Market Conditions. U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2005. 
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Table 17: Number of Bedrooms38  
  Efficiency  One  Two  Three Four Average39
Louisiana 896 8,601 10,386 3,664 817 1.83 
Mississippi 33 2,750 5,805 3,087 460 2.10 
Nation - - - - - 1.93 
 
Other Selected LIHTC Development Characteristics 
  
Louisiana and Mississippi LIHTC developments also differed on other selected 
characteristics.  Furthermore, a number of nonprofit builders engaged in LIHTC development in 
the area between 1990 and 2003.  As indicated by Figure 10, fewer nonprofit builders 
sponsored LIHTC projects in Mississippi than in Louisiana.  Also, the number of nonprofit 
builders in Louisiana spiked between 1997 and 2001 before falling after the turn of the century.  
The number of nonprofit builders in Mississippi generally remained below three between 1995 
and 2003. However, 9 projects were sponsored by Mississippi nonprofit builders in 1996. With 
the exceptions of a few years, very few nonprofit builders sponsor developments in comparison 
with for profit entities (see Table 18). 
Figure 10: Nonprofit Builders by Year 
 
Table 18: Nonprofit Builders by Year (Percentage of Total Developers) 
 
                                                
38 National data from U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1st Quarter 2005. U.S. Housing Market Conditions. U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2005. 
39 Weighted average  
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GIS Analysis - Findings 
 The literature review found that Louisiana and Mississippi LIHTC developments vary by 
location; developments tended to be located in areas with concentrations of populations 
burdened by housing costs.  GIS analysis findings indicated that the concentration of tax credit 
units varies by location (see Figure 11).  Developers tend to build units near large cities.  
Groups of units exist in Shreveport, Lafayette, Baton Rouge, New Orleans and Jackson prior to 
the storms.   
Figure 11: LIHTC Units 
 
Regression Analyses - Findings 
To further examine the development location in metropolitan areas, researchers 
performed a regression analysis of developments within census tracts of the six cities with the 
highest LIHTC concentrations.  The areas of analysis included Jackson, Gulfport-Biloxi, and 
Hattiesburg in Mississippi.  It also included New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Lake Charles in 
Louisiana. Three hundred and sixty-six (366) census tracts lie within the cities of interest.  
LIHTC developments exist in only 66 of the census tracts; 300 census tracts have no LIHTC 
developments (see Figure 12).  This made statistical regression analysis difficult. Not enough 
non-zero observations (census tracts with LIHTC units) existed to produce a sufficiently robust 
analysis. 
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Figure 12: Regression Analyses 
 
Regression Analyses  
In addition to determining the number of LIHTC developments and units in the GO-Zone, 
CAPSTONE conducted a series of analyses examining the placement and distribution of the 
LIHTC units.  CAPSTONE used regression analyses to attempt to predict the placement and 
distribution of LIHTC developments.  The dependent variable in this investigation is the number 
of LIHTC units in a census tract observation.  Twenty-two independent variables were included 
in this analysis; they are explained in Table 28 below.  The cities included in this analysis are 
New Orleans, Lake Charles, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Jackson, Gulfport-Biloxi, and 
Hattiesburg, Mississippi. These six cities were chosen because they have the highest 
concentrations of LIHTC units in the GO-Zone areas of their respective states.  Data from all six 
cities were combined for the analyses.  This was necessary in order to achieve a sufficient 
number of observations to obtain interpretable results from the analyses.   
 
Table 32 presents the Pearson Correlation coefficients for the dependent variable (the 
number of low income housing tax credit units in a census tract) and the 22 independent 
variables.  The magnitude of the first order correlation coefficients is modest at best.  Even 
given the sizeable sample size of 366 census tracts, only XX of the independent variables are 
significantly correlated at the .05 level with the number of housing units in the census tracts.   
 
An OLS regression analysis based on all 22 independent variables for the collapsed 
data set across all six areas yielded a multiple r value of .36 (R-squared = .13, adjusted R-
squared =. 07; see Table 29.  The regression coefficients for seven independent variables were 
statistically significant at the .05 level – percentage white; percentage African American; 
percentage Asian; percentage holding a Bachelor’s degree; percentage unemployed; and 
percentage of female-headed households.   
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The results of this analysis with respect to the significance of individual variables should 
be interpreted with considerable caution, because of the high levels of multi-collinearity among 
the independent variables.  (The same holds true for the other regression analyses described 
below).  As can be seen in Table 30; the correlation coefficients between many independent 
variables are quite high, in a number of cases exceeding .7 or .8 and in at least one case 
approaching unity (i.e. the correlation between percent white and percent African-American is -
.99).  More accurate estimates of the strength of the influence of independent variables on the 
dependent variable would require reducing the dimensionality of the set of independent 
variables through factor analysis or similar means.  Because predictive analysis was modest, 
we did not elect to take this extra step although this might be a useful future exercise.   
Because the distribution of the dependent variable is clearly non-normal, results of OLS 
regression analyses may be quite misleading.  Out of the 366 census tract observations from 
the six cities included in the analysis, only 66 (18.03%) contain any LIHTC units.  The 
distribution of the LIHTC variable is displayed in Figure 21.   
 
In light of the highly positively skewed distribution of the independent variable, we 
performed two further forms of regression analysis.  
 
The first was probit analysis attempts to categorize census tracts into two groups – those 
with LIHTC units and those that do not contain any such housing.  The results of the probit 
analysis appear in Table 31. The analysis yields a pseudo r-squared value of .19. In this 
analysis, the regression coefficients for two independent variables were statistically significant at 
the .05 level – percentage holding a Bachelor’s degree and percentage unemployed.   
 
The second additional analysis we performed was zero inflated negative binomial 
regression which is well-suited for the case in which the dependent variable consists of count 
data with many zero observations and a distinct positive skew.  This analysis added little 
additional insight but it is noteworthy that in this analytical approach a housing quality index (i.e. 
whether there is a kitchen) emerges as a significant predictor of the presence of LIHTC units.    
 
In conclusion, the predictive power of the analyses was modest but still statistically 
significant.  The various analyses suggested that a number of variables offer some degree of 
predictive power.  These are in the categories of Education, Ethnicity, Income, and Housing 
Quality, all of which are variables commonly assumed to be contributing factors to low-income 
housing development.  An additional complication in interpreting the results is that education; 
ethnicity, income and housing quality are all correlated with one another.  This multicollinearity 
makes it difficult to tease out causal pathways.   
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Summary 
 Both states became involved with the LIHTC program after its first year of existence, 
relying on the program in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Data also indicates that Louisiana 
had more LIHTC units in the GO Zone than Mississippi.  Similarly, both states indicated a 
decreasing trend in the number of tax credits claimed annually and although more credits were 
claimed in Louisiana than in Mississippi.  The last measure of involvement included a study of 
the number of contractors, which indicated that 34 developers built LIHTC units in the Louisiana 
GO Zone and 26 developers built LIHTC units in the Mississippi GO Zone prior to Hurricane 
Katrina.  
 
 Physical characteristics included new and rehabilitative construction in addition to the 
number of bedrooms per unit.  About 60% of the units in Mississippi and Louisiana consisted of 
newly constructed units.  Also, Mississippi developments tended to cater to larger households 
than Louisiana LIHTC developments, but the projects generally consisted of one or two 
bedroom units.  
 
 GIS analyses indicated that developments tend to be located near metropolitan areas. 
However, a series of regression analyses revealed the multicollinearity of several variables 
including education, income and housing quality as indicators of LIHTC development. This 
means that the placement of LIHTC developments may not solely rely upon low-income factors. 
Both Louisiana and Mississippi have either built or rehabilitated thousands of affordable 
housing units since the LIHTC Program’s inception but a reduction in the need for affordable 
housing is the ultimate measure of the success of their building efforts and as was indicated in 
the first section, there are varying estimates of the amount of need. Hence it important to 
resolve the issue created by varying estimates of the amount of need so that the national HUD 
data base can be interpreted and so that the federal government can assess the success of the 
program.  
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Selected GO Zone Parish and County Case Studies 
  
The GO Zone is depicted in the blue shaded areas of the maps below.  GO Zone 
parishes included in the study New Orleans.  Those areas were Jefferson, Orleans, St. Bernard 
and St. Tammany parishes.  The coastal Mississippi areas of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson 
counties were also analyzed. 
 
Figure 13: Louisiana GO Zone    Figure 14: Mississippi GO Zone          
 
The regression analysis attempted to determine the underlying reason for the placement of 
LIHTC developments but the multicollinearity of several variables prevented researchers from 
created a clear causal model.  Thus, researchers chose a different methodological approach to 
discover the determinants for the placement of LIHTC developments. This methodology 
involved a closer examination of the GO Zone areas that were the hardest hit by Hurricanes 
Katina and Rita and thus most in need of LIHTC developments.  
 
Researchers used three methodologies to examine the areas more closely: 1) additional HUD 
data base analyses; 2) an analysis of pre-Katrina census data on coastal areas 3) a review of 
research reports about coastal areas. Specifically, researchers reviewed Rand (2006, 2007), 
Policy Link (2007) Bureau of Government Relations or BGR (2007) and GRC (2007). 
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Selected Coastal Louisiana GO Zone Parishes  
 
HUD Data Base Findings on Coastal Go-Zone Areas 
 
A review of the HUD data base indicated that historically, St. Bernard, St. Tammany and 
Plaquemines Parishes have received substantially fewer LIHTC units than Jefferson and 
Orleans parishes (see Figure 15 and Table 19).  
 
Figure 15: LIHTC Units by Year in Selected Louisiana GO Zone Parishes (Pre-Katrina) 
Selected Louisiana GO Zone LIHTC Units 1986‐2004
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Table 19: LIHTC Units by Year in Selected Louisiana GO Zone Parishes (Pre-Katrina) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Jefferson 0 0 437 168 204 0 201 31 0 140 0 48 0 0 73 92 48 0 1442
Orleans 205 205 684 126 32 0 37 16 177 574 313 144 228 316 0 30 0 0 3087
Plaquemines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
St Bernard 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
St Tammany 96 12 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 242
Louisiana
 
Census Demographic Data of Coastal Go- Zone Areas 
 
Census data revealed that pre-Katrina, St. Bernard and St. Tammany residents were 
predominately white, homeowners with substantially less poverty than Jefferson and Orleans 
parish residents (see Table 20). The connection between these demographic characteristics 
and protests against the implementation of LIHTC developments will be discussed more fully 
below. 
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Table 20: Selected Louisiana GO Zone Parish Demographics40 
Demographic Variables Parish 
          Jefferson Orleans St. Bernard St. Tammany 
Population     455,466 484,764 67,229 191,268 
Ethnic Composition (% white)    69.81% 28.05% 88.29% 87.03% 
Home Ownership     63.86% 46.53% 74.64% 80.46% 
Income      $30,052 $27,133 $27,841  $35,624  
Families Below Poverty    22% 23.70% 13.60% 11.60% 
Policy Link Estimate of  Housing 
Need   13,972 51,681 5,936 3,931 
LIHTC Building Replacement     1,227 9,157 0 802 
 
Research Report Findings 
 
LIHTC Protests or Expressions of NIMBY Attitudes 
 
Policy Link (2007) reported that post-Katrina, St. Bernard and St. Tammany 
(predominantly white homeowners who received substantial housing damage), protested 
against LIHTC developments 41 and the impact of NIMBY attitudes will be discussed more fully 
in the next section.  
 
Allocation Gaps 
 
At the parish level, there are substantial and gaps in housing.42  Specifically, Table 21 
and Figure 16 indicate that Orleans Parish received the brunt of the damage as well as the 
majority of the LIHTC credits, according to Policy Link and the Bureau of Governmental 
Research (BGR).  Even so, a substantial need for housing units remains in the parish.   
 
Table 21: Selected Louisiana Parish GO Zone LIHTC Allocation Gaps 
Parish 
Percentage 
of Units with 
Severe 
Damage 
Percentage 
of Units in 
Parish that 
are LIHTC  
Total 
Rental 
Units 
Lost  
LIHTC Units 
Needed Post 
Katrina 
(Policy Link 
Estimate) 
Percent 
Rebuilt Gap 
LIHTC Units 
Needed Post-
Katrina BGR 
Estimate 
Calcasieu     2.40% 9.40% 1,953 1,408 72.10% (550) 1,020 
Cameron    0.70% 0.20% 551 30 5.40% (521)   
Jefferson    17.00% 8.20% 13,972 1,227 8.80% (12,745) 460 
Orleans    62.90% 61.20% 51,681 9,157 17.70% (42,524) 3,786 
Plaquemines   1.80% 0.00% 1,457 0 0.00% (1,457)   
St. Bernard   7.20% 0.00% 5,936 0 0.00% (5,936)   
St. Tammany   4.80% 5.40% 3,931 802 20.40% (3,129) 552 
Vermillion   0.60% 2.10% 468 310 66.20% (158)   
Rest of GO Zone   2.70% 13.90% 2,196 2,083 95.00% (118) 60 
State Total       82,145 14,957 18.20% (67,188)   
 Source: (Clark and Rose June 2007) / (BGR 2007) 
                                                
40 U.S. Census Bureau. United States - Data Sets - American FactFinder. 2000. 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=DEC&_submenuId=datasets_1&_lang=en (accessed 
April 10, 2008); Bureau of Government Research. Public Investment, Private Development. How Louisiana Employed Its GO 
Zone Housing Tax Credits. New Orleans: Bureau of Government Research, 2007. 
41 (Clark and Rose 2007) 
42 Ibid. 
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Figure 16: Selected Louisiana Parish GO Zone LIHTC Allocation Gaps  
Louisiana Parish Level                             LIHTC Unit Allocation Gaps
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The Cost of Mixed Income LIHTC Units vs. Non-Mixed Income LIHTC Units 
 
BGR (2007) calculated that mixed income housing was more expensive than 
developments with 100% LIHTC units at all area median incomes (see Table 22).  
Table 22: Non-Mixed vs. Mixed LIHTC Unit Costs 
 Unit Affordable to 3-Person Household in New Orleans Area (2006) 
 20% AMI 40% AMI 60% AMI 80% AMI 
  100% 
TC** 
Mixed 
Income 
100% 
TC 
Mixed 
Income 
100% TC Mixed 
Income 
100% TC Mixed 
Income 
Affordable Rent $109  $109 $344 $344 $580 $580 $815  $815 
Less: Vacancy (7%) -8 -8 -24 -24 -41 -41 -57 -57 
Other Income 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Less: Operating Expenses -334 -354 -334 -334 -334 -334 -334 -354 
Less: Revenue -25 -25 -25 -25 -25 -25 -25 -25 
Net Operating Income -238 -258 -19 -19 200 180 419 399 
Present Value of NOI* -34,645 -38,645 -2,862 -5,862 30,060 27,060 62,850 59,843 
Total Development Costs 99,000 135,000 99,000 135,000 99,000 135,000 99,000 135,000 
$ Gap $63,859  $99,859 $96,100 $129,100 $129,460 $162,440 $162,688  $195,641 
**TC=Tax Credit 
Source: (Bureau of Government Research 2007)    
 
Scholars and policy makers e.g., PolicyLink (2007) have expressed preference for mixed-
income developments. Mixed income housing gained prominence in housing law and policy during 
the 1990s.  Such developments sound attracting because of the potential to serve a variety of 
purposes, including de-concentrating low income developments, integrating poor households into 
the economic mainstream, and revitalizing neighborhoods. In New Orleans the Bureau of 
Government Relations published information in the table below which indicated that mixed income 
housing was more expensive than developments with 100% LIHTC units (see Table 23 and Figure 
20). This cost caused a political debate following a redistribution of the LIHTC towards mixed 
housing allocations. Although mixed housing would assist the nation in obtaining a larger goal of 
desegregated housing and increased job placement for certain marginalized ethnic groups, it 
would initially cost more than non-mixed income units.  This cost could decrease the number of 
units available to low-income households. 
 
Louisiana LIHTC Program Effectiveness & Oversight 
39 
 
Policy Link (2007) reviewed the efforts of the Louisiana Recovery Authority, the 
Louisiana Housing Finance Agency (LHFA), and the Louisiana Office of Community 
Development in their first year of recovery. The report found: 
 The New Orleans metro region—made up of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Tammany, St. 
Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes suffered huge housing losses in the aftermath of the 
storms; 
 The LHFA apportioned the Low Income Housing Tax Credits through three competitive 
rounds in 2006 and 2007;  
 The first two rounds of allocations in 2006 did not prioritize the deeper affordability goals 
or target areas with the heaviest damage in their scoring criteria;  
 LIHTC units are being placed in urban areas where they can be more easily approved 
instead of where they are more needed. This illuminates a significant issue with the 
reliance of the LIHTC program since non-urban areas have a need for affordable 
housing, yet they are not using the program. Because of the per project overhead costs 
of legal and financial underwriting, only larger projects (40+ units) can efficiently use the 
tax credit; 
 The LHFA received no applications for developments in St. Bernard and Plaquemines, 
so these parishes were not allocated funds. In the rest of the region, both Orleans and 
St. Tammany received a proportional share of developments in relation to their damage, 
while Jefferson Parish is lagging behind and even the developments that were financed 
are facing opposition from the parish. Overall, the region looks to only rebuild 14 percent 
of rental housing damaged and destroyed. 
 
Selected Coastal Mississippi GO Zone Counties 
 
A review of the HUD data base indicated that Hancock, and Jefferson counties have had 
substantially less LIHTC than Harrison and Jackson (see Figure 17 and Table 23).  
Figure 17: LIHTC Units by Year in Selected Mississippi GO Zone Counties (Pre-Katrina) 
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Table 23: LIHTC Units by Year in Selected Mississippi GO Zone Counties (Pre-Katrina) 
r 
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Hancock 0 0 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48
Harrison* 0 0 0 0 92 0 118 136 40 0 144 0 0 56 183 0 0 0 769
Jefferson 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Jackson 0 0 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 46 0 198 52 365
Hinds** 0 0 0 0 25 90 364 957 209 244 351 0 146 472 0 114 269 228 3469
Mississippi
 
 
Census Demographic Data of Coastal Go- Zone Areas 
 
Hancock County has substantially more Caucasian homeowners than does Harrison or 
Jackson and less poverty Jackson (Table 24). The literature reported that Hancock protested 
the implementation of LIHTC developments. However, the impact of NIMBY attitudes will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 24: Mississippi County Level Demographics 
Demographic Variables County 
          Hancock Harrison Jackson 
Population     42,967 189,601 131,420 
Ethnic Composition (% white)    90.19% 73.15% 75.35% 
Home Ownership     79.58% 62.66% 74.57% 
Income      $33,353  $47,883  $34,004  
Families Below Poverty    13.60% 7.60% 19.05% 
Post-Katrina Housing Loss/Need   1672 3508 529 
LIHTC Building Replacement     937 3,380 1,039 
Source: (McCarthy and Hanson 2007); (Mississippi Home Corporation 2008) 
Units determined as moderately or severely damaged 
 
Research Report Findings 
 
The Mississippi legislature established the Mississippi Home Corporation (MHC) in 1989 
to construct and rehabilitate single and multifamily housing for low to moderate income people. 
In 1990, MHC began to administer the LIHTC program. 
MHC develops an annual Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) which designates housing 
priorities throughout the state and indicates the application process for potential developers. 
The QAP also indicates the nature of compliance monitoring. Specifically, during the fifteen-year 
compliance period, MHC monitors developments by reviewing tenant files, auditing and 
physically inspecting units.  MHC reports major noncompliance issues to the IRS.  
The Mississippi legislature created the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance 
Evaluation and Expenditure Review (PEER) in 1973.  PEER is composed of fourteen members 
from the House of Representatives and the Senate.  
In 1998, PEER found that MHC had allowed developers to exceed maximum cost per 
unit guidelines; provided an advantage to developers who have a record of noncompliance; and, 
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failed to monitor developers’ compliance with debt service ratio requirements. Explanations for 
why each had happened were provided. 
In 2006, PEER attempted to determine whether MHC informed citizens of proposed tax 
credit projects in their neighborhoods; physically inspected the suitability of proposed sites for 
prior to project approval; repeatedly approved the same developers; held developers 
accountable for maintaining their tax credit developments; and obtained feedback from the 
target population.  
 
PEER suggested several improvements of the program to the Mississippi legislature in their 
final report.  Specifically, they suggested: 
 
 Requests to exceed the maximum cost per unit should be the rare exception rather than 
common practice.   
 That there be documentation of each requested increase and why each requested 
increase was necessary to the viability of the development.   
 Modification of the automated spreadsheet used to calculate financial feasibility and the 
addition of a field to indicate whether MHC approved a requested increase.  
 That unit be distributed by annually monitoring the need for low-income housing 
throughout the state based on the annual assessments of the location of low-income 
developments constructed and in comparison to the number of substandard housing 
units per county (rather than solely relying on the market studies to determine the 
number of low-income units an area can absorb);  
 That MHC contact city entities at the fifty-percent building development completion. Such 
notification would ensure compliance with local codes and permits earlier in the process, 
reducing the issues to arise between the local government and the developer.  
 
Summary  
 
Research agencies reported that parishes and counties in both Louisiana and 
Mississippi protested the implementation of LIHTC, that non-urban areas have a need for 
affordable housing, yet they are not using the program, that there were substantial gaps in 
housing created by a lack of rental units after the storm, that mixed income LIHTC units were 
more expensive than non-mixed LIHTC units at all area median incomes.  
 
State LIHTC Program Oversight 
 
A legislative oversight committee found that MHC has allowed developers to exceed 
maximum cost per unit guidelines; provided an advantage to developers who have a record of 
noncompliance; failed to monitor developers’ compliance with debt service ratio requirements. 
The commission felt requests to exceed the maximum cost per unit should be the rare exception 
rather than common practice, that MHC should automated its spreadsheet, distribute low-
income housing units by annually, monitoring the need for low-income housing throughout the 
state based on annual assessments of the location of low-income developments constructed in 
comparison to the number of substandard housing units per county, rather than solely relying on 
the market studies to determine the number of low-income units an area can absorb. Studies by 
the oversight committee were eight years apart and it is unclear what transpired in the interim. 
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State housing authorities receive information regarding national program amendments 
and new legislation from the National Council of State Housing Agencies, which serves as the 
liaison between Congress and the states, and other industry leaders. Required reports are 
submitted to NCSHA, the Internal Revenue Service and a number of other monitoring agencies, 
upon their request (e.g. GAO). Annual reports are submitted using IRS Form 8610 and Form 
8610 Schedule A. A copy of all information is also provided to NCSHA as oversight agency for 
all states administering the LIHTC program.  
 
Though housing authorities maintain and  provide data required by Federal agencies, they do 
not have the research capacity to assess the amount of damage to LIHTC units. Further, 
historically, housing agencies in both states have relied extensively on builder-developer market 
studies to determine the amount of housing need in various parishes and counties. However, 
such market studies could be biased i.e., builders might report a need in a area in order to 
receive a state contract. Hence it might be useful for housing authorities to assess the amount 
of housing need in each county or parish in some other fashion 
 
Housing Authority LIHTC Program Data Management  
 
Though LHFA and MHC have data analyst who create regular excel spreadsheets 
indicating amounts LIHTC developments and units allocated, when the data bases are released 
to other agencies, the amounts developments and units calculated vary substantially. Tables 25 
and 26 below reveal that different sources provided different estimates for both number of 
LIHTC projects and number of units allocated.  
 
Table 25: Variance in Estimates - LIHTC Projects in Louisiana 
 Source 
Projects 
(State Total) 
Units  
(State Total) Year 
BGR (2007) 178 12,345 2007 
Policy Link (2007)   14,957 2007 
GCR (2008) 258 17,348 2008 
 
Table 26: Variance in Estimates - LIHTC Units in Selected Parishes  
 Source Jefferson Orleans St. Bernard 
BGR (2007) 1027 9357 0 
Policy Link (2007) 1227 9157 0 
GCR (2008) 3068 17515 954 
 
Louisiana or Mississippi lack data governance capability i.e., a specified set of 
procedures to make sure LIHTC data are both accurate and available. A data governance entity 
could regularly communicate and reanalyzed data for various users of the information. The 
entity might also integrate and synchronize data from different data systems, reconcile 
inconsistent and provide a data dictionary with agreed upon definitions for each data element as 
well as produce reports in a standard formats utilizing standardized interpretations. A data 
governance entity could codify ways of coding, inserting, updating, deleting, validating and 
editing data accuracy and the entity should appoint an individual to be responsible for 
communicating data for the entity. A data governance entity could avoid duplicated effort. 
Jeanne Ross and Peter Weil of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) say that data 
governance should ensure decisions match objectives by establishing mechanisms for linking 
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objectives to measurable goals43. Members of a data governance entity could develop generate 
a data dictionary and standardize an approved data format and would implement quality check 
procedures, develop an issue log on which they record challenges to the accuracy and quality of 
the data and they should log their means of resolving the data issues.  
 
Census data are used to calculate the population estimates used to allocate LIHTC. A recent 
article by United Nations Expert Group Meeting to review critical issues relevant to the planning 
of the 2010 Census generated several alternatives to the census. Alternatives included the use 
of register/administrative records including local registers on social security, water and electricity 
supply, information on foreign population and old age pension fund system or alternately a 
sample surveys approach with annual collection of data.44  A final alternative is a periodic 
Internet census, wherein GIS experts query all accessible Internet addresses every few months. 
The internet census taker must count an entire address space and its correspondence to 
adjacent addresses.  
 
“Census blocks, the smallest geographic area for which the Bureau of the Census collects and 
tabulates decennial census data, are formed by streets, roads, railroads, streams and other 
bodies of water, other visible physical and cultural features, and the legal boundaries shown on 
Census Bureau maps. Census data for these areas serve as a valuable source for small-area 
geographic studies.”45  Mandatory annual block counting is one of the alternatives to the 
American Housing Survey. Table 27 presents an example of LIHTC block counting at the district 
level. Detailed data like those reveal housing needs that are hidden by county, state and federal 
unit counts, hence providing local legislators with a better picture of residents’ housing needs 
 
                                                
43 Excellence in Application & Data Governance, http://www.dbq.or.kr/conference/2006/pdf/Keynotespeech_ITPLUS.pdf 
44 Social and Housing Statistics Section. Demographic and Social Statistics Branch. United Nations Statistics Division. Alternative 
Census Designs: An Overview of Issues. United Nations Expert Group Meeting to Review Critical Issues Relevant to the Planning 
of the 2010 Round of Population and Housing Censuses, New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
2004. 
45 http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/Ch11GARM.pdf 
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Table 27: Proposed Block Counting (e.g. District Level counting) 
Parish and District Total Number of LIHTCs 
Allocated (units) 
Percent of Units 
within the Parish 
Orleans 9,157 100.0% 
District A 959 10.5% 
District B 2,876 31.4% 
District C 2,484 27.1% 
District D 1,127 12.3% 
District E 1,655 18.1% 
Undetermined 56 6.1% 
Jefferson  1,227  100.0% 
District 1  538 43.8% 
District 2  25 2.0% 
District 3  664 54.1% 
District 4 0 0.0% 
District 5  0  0.0% 
St. Tammany  802 100.0% 
District 3  3 21.4% 
District 5  2 7.5% 
District 12  1 15.0% 
District 13  3 49.6% 
District 14 1 6.5% 
Other Districts 0 0.0% 
Based on (Clark and Rose June 2007) 
 
.  
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Face-to-Face Field Interviews 
 Face-to-face interviews provided rich narratives in regards to builder-developer decision-
making.  The responses were used to form the telephone survey.  
Methodology  
Researchers traveled to the GO Zone to conduct field interviews.  While in the region, 
researchers interviewed housing authority officials, developers, nonprofit staff and state and 
local government officials. Researchers logged responses and gathered data in the form of 
notes and tape recorded conversations. All interviews were conducted at agency headquarters, 
private firms, or other designated locations in coastal Louisiana and Mississippi.  
Findings 
This section summarizes the information gathered during the face-to-face study 
component of the project.  This summary of responses allows the reader to see LIHTC program 
positives, challenges and insights using three lenses; government agency perspectives, non-
profit agency perspectives and private builder-developer perspectives.  
 Housing authorities lauded the LIHTC program for producing housing for citizens with 
the highest need, producing large numbers of affordable housing (8,000 units in Mississippi), 
increasing cooperation in Louisiana parishes, encouraging better building codes, and potentially 
increasing development quality through improved funding for amenities.  Challenges mentioned 
by the housing authorities included frustrations with the Stafford Act; housing taking a backseat 
to infrastructure repairs; slow rebuilding due to permitting, public notice, NIMBYism and the 
surveyor/engineer approval process; and strained intergovernmental relations. Other concerns 
include implications of a lack of deep affordability for single parents, pressure to rebuild 
moderate and high income homes, and immovable placed in service dates.  Housing authorities 
suggested that developer interest could be increased by use of 9% credits and subsidized 
insurance costs, local governments can help developers in the pre-application process, and 
local administration of the LIHTC program.   
 
Nonprofit agencies suggested that LIHTC program advantages include increased unity 
among nonprofit organizations and Louisiana organizations have been able to recover and 
mitigate future disasters.  Challenges included NIMBYism, workforce housing, costly market 
studies, disparity in wages and rent costs, lack of education for developers, and high insurance 
costs.  Interviews with nonprofit agencies revealed changed definition discrepancy for 
“affordable,” “allocation versus placed in service,” and “workforce housing versus low-income 
housing.” Increased focus on workforce housing decreases available housing for destitute 
households, increasing homeless populations.  Nonprofit agencies provided several solutions.  
The private sector should build workforce housing, developers should use litigation to ensure 
progress, the permit process should be streamlined, and fair housing and housing rights should 
be enforced. Other solutions include creating community buy-in through nonprofit organizations, 
targeting of geographical areas for mixed-income development, lowering the break-even point, 
amending scoring criteria, including wind-damaged properties in rejuvenation efforts, improving 
code enforcement, pushing back placed in service dates to account for delays, encouraging 
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permanent supportive housing through vouchers, and decrease the area median income level to 
meet community development needs. 
 
 Private sector builders and developers did not provide as many suggestions for program 
positives.  Mississippi developers suggested that the LIHTC program is normally a fair process if 
the builder/developer understands the application process.  Program challenges included 
NIMBYism, lack of incentives, real-time market delays, lack of publicizing the LIHTC program in 
Louisiana, lack of transparency and communication of changes in the application/allocation 
process, and lack of rehabilitating existing structures. Other program challenges included stigma 
attached to “low-income” or “affordable” in program titles, the use of out-of-state staff in 
application scoring which may have been the reason for lack of uniformity in evaluations, the 
gap in the number of LIHTC credits and damaged housing, a discrepancy in credit allocation 
and placed in service, and a lack of adjustment for changes in the market.  Private sector 
builders suggested that affordability could be increased by LIHTCs and Section 8 vouchers, by 
pairing LIHTCs with CDBG funds in Mississippi, and by raising the level of credits allocated. To 
overcome NIMBYism, the developers suggested avoiding politics and maintaining community 
relationships. 
 
Summary  
 
The survey and field study reveal several major themes and concerns of builders, 
housing officials and nonprofit agencies. Foremost among the findings is the importance of the 
permit office and its various forms for determining the impact of the market and the impact of the 
public private partnership involved in the LIHTC Program. Other findings include the need for 
increased oversight committee enforcement capacity; streamlined permit office procedures; use 
of anti-NIMBY, mixed income housing and inclusive zoning strategies; coordinated local, state 
and federal guidelines; re-examined financial technicalities; reviewed area median income 
requirements; and an understanding of the ties impact of the housing market collapse on GO 
Zone LIHTCs.  These same items surfaced in the Telephone Survey Section below and are 
discussed in depth in the concluding pages of that section. 
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Telephone Survey 
 
The telephone survey aimed to inform CRS on the use of LIHTCs in Mississippi and 
Louisiana. Researchers constructed survey instruments for both Credit Award Winners and Non 
Credit Award Winners (see Appendix B). From the responses, it was determined that the 
builders and developers that did not receive LIHTC awards did not build affordable housing. 
 
A small sample size allows for limited quantitative analysis. However, Mississippi 
builder-developers provided rich narratives for researchers.  This information was obtained from 
Louisiana builders and developers because of a low response rate. 
Methodology 
Sample 
 
A number of developers applied for LIHTCs in Louisiana and Mississippi in 2006.. The 
research team interviewed both the successful and unsuccessful applicants.  Thirty-one (31) 
developers applied for 99 projects in Louisiana.  Fourteen (14) of the Louisiana applicants 
received LIHTCs.  Twenty-five (25) of the Louisiana applicants did not receive LIHTCs.  Some 
overlap existed: 8 developers had projects that were both approved and rejected.  The following 
diagram indicates the number of developers and the results of their applications. The research 
team attempted to contact a total of 31 developers, reflecting the total number of developers 
that applied for LIHTCs in Louisiana in 2006.  
Figure 18: Louisiana Developers 
 
 
Thirty-four (34) developers applied for 115 projects in Mississippi.  Thirteen (13) of the 
applicants received LIHTCs.  Twenty-nine (29) of the applicants did not receive LIHTCs.  As 
with Louisiana, some overlap existed: 8 developers had projects that were both approved and 
rejected.  The following diagram indicates the number of developers and the results of their 
applications. The research team attempted to contact a total of 20 developers, reflecting the 
total number of developers that applied for LIHTCs in Mississippi in 2006. 
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Figure 19: Mississippi Developers 
 
 
 
Finally, 2 developers had projects both in Mississippi pool and in Louisiana pool: 1 
developer had both 1 approved application in Mississippi and 1 approved one in Louisiana; 1 
developer had both 1 rejected application in Mississippi and 1 approved one in Louisiana. 
Therefore, the total population in Mississippi and Louisiana was 49. The following diagram 
means each number of developers in both states and the table indicates the number of 
developers with whom we had conducted the survey. 
Figure 20: LIHTC Developers 
 
 
Participants in the survey included 16 developers who had applied the LIHTC in 2006 in 
both Louisiana and Mississippi. The response rate was 32.65%. The sample was predominantly 
developers in Mississippi (93.75%) and 75% of sample were credit award winners.  
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Procedure 
 
The following steps delineate the telephone survey procedure. Step One: Develop the 
survey instruments for both credit award winners and non-credit award winners. Step Two: 
Create or establish the pool of interviewees based on the application pool. Step Three: Draft an 
interview schedule for four researchers to make calls. Step Five: Conduct the interviews and 
report the results. Step Six: Compile the results of survey and develop a tool for analyzing the 
results. Step Seven: Analyze the narrative and numeric data.  
 
Researchers asked respondents to complete the survey instruments by phone. The 
survey took about 20 minutes to complete. Interviewees created a unique identification code 
that did not reveal the interviewees’ identities, which were used to match the narrative results.  
 
Survey Instrument 
 
The research team constructed a survey instrument (See Appendix B).  The instrument 
contained 36 items for credit award winners and 31 items for non-credit award winners.  The 
items requested information regarding the LIHTC program in addition to satisfaction with the 
application and allocation process.  
 
Survey items were measured on interval, ordinal, nominal measures. For the items 
regarding the application and allocation process, the survey items were scored on a 10-point 
scale. Some items requested additional narrative answers.  Some nominal items consist of ‘yes 
or no’ questions and others used multiple choice formatting. 
Findings 
 Narrative responses provided several suggestions for improvements, some of which 
applied to the LIHTC program.  Responses suggested streamlining permit office procedures; 
addressing ‘not in my back yard’ attitude (NIMBYism) and inclusive zoning; coordinating local, 
state and federal guidelines; allocating credits according to need; re-examining financial aspects 
of the program; and re-evaluating area median income requirements.  Each of these 
suggestions could mitigate threats to developer decisions to enter the LIHTC market. 
 
 The following information consists of quotes from the respondents to the telephone 
survey. These quotes were chosen because they were the most common responses or because 
they provided with specific guidance to the state or federal government.  Finally, the section 
arrives at the suggestion that a study of permitting data may provide an answer to the question 
regarding non-credit award winners’ decisions to enter the affordable housing market. 
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Survey Answers Relevant To State Housing Administrators 
Builder-Developers (That Received a State Contracts) Responses 
 
Question: What made this process to obtain building permits difficult? 
Answers: 
 It depended on the location. Some locations use the building permit process 
as a way of keeping out tax credit housing that they do not want in their 
community. Further, before you can apply for the permits, you have to clear 
the Corps of Engineers wetlands gauntlet. 
 The building permit process is slowed by planning commissions and NIMBY 
issues. There are also usually issues of engineering. It is a very arduous 
process. 
 In New Orleans, the infrastructure isn't in place to return the process to pre-
hurricane standards.  FEMA Guidelines are very difficult to abide by. 
Question: Why do you think the community was not receptive to LIHTC units 
being placed in their neighborhoods? 
Answers: 
 We really only had one problem: in Gulfport, the local government (County 
Board of Supervisors) gave out letters to developers saying that their 
developments did not fit into the Consolidated Housing Plan for the area. 
They said there was no more need for LIHTC. In reality, they just didn't want 
LIHTC developments built in their area. They view the hurricane as an 
opportunity to build back for tourism, not low-income housing. 
 They are not receptive because of socioeconomic and discrimination issues. 
 Don't know the reason, but it’s a lesson in human nature.  If they were 
receptive before the storm were receptive after.  If they were unreceptive 
before the storm they were unreceptive after. 
Question: What reasons would you cite as the cause of any delays you may have 
experienced in the building process?  
Answers: 
 Largest single problem has been the Corps of Engineers drastically 
increasing their involvement in Wetlands determinations across the State. We 
now have high and dry hill sides being declared wetlands, which we have to 
spend more money on to pay the extortion like prices from the former Corps 
employees who for the most part as I understand own the mitigation banks 
that you have to buy credits from. The cost is one problem, but even more 
deadly is the extended process and time consumed in trying to get through 
the Corps, the Department of Marine Resources and the Miss. Dept. of 
Environmental Quality. 
Next would be the communities who did not want LIHTC housing and 
knowing that there are really sensitive time deadlines on completing same, 
have delayed allowing the developments to get started, waiting for them to 
die against the hard deadlines in the program. 
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 The low-incoming housing development process is very time-consuming. And 
there are zoning issues, NIMBY issues and annexation issues that make it 
even more difficult and the process more." 
Builder Developers (Who Did Not Receive a Contract) Responses 
 
Question:  Which parts of the allocation and application process were more 
difficult? 
Answer: LA was a problem because of scoring inconsistencies and [a lack of 
coordination] between LHFA, LRA and Office of Community Development 
(who administers the CDBG funds). The organizations had different goals 
and succeeded in pushing urbanized incentives, neglecting the small, rural 
towns. LRA didn't know much about LIHTC scoring and didn't have authority, 
so they had to advise LHFA on the QAP. Institutional jealousy resulted in a 
garbled and inconsistent QAP. Institutional differences also resulted in a 
staffing problem. LRA and OCD paid higher salaries than LHFA, so the 2 
organizations would ""cherry-pick"" qualified staff. This left LHFA understaffed 
and ill-equipped to walk through the scoring process. The agency was used 
to dealing with an $8 million dollar credit authority, but received a $100-200 
million credit authority after the storm. LHFA simply did not have the human 
resources to administer the program effectively. 
 
Survey Answers Relevant To Federal Legislators46 
 
Builder Developers (Who Received a State Contract) Responses 
 
Question: What would be another possible way to allocate the credits to states? 
Answers: 
 Same method, but weighted for need, rural, DDA, etc. 
 Yes, this is the most effective way. Any other way may be way too political, 
but maybe if there was some way to allocate the credits by percent of 
poverty. 
 The process should depend on the need for low-income housing in each 
state, but I am not sure how that would be measurable. 
Question: Is there anything you would like to tell me to help me better understand 
the benefits and challenges associated with contracting with LIHTC 
program or the GO-ZONE Act? 
Answer: The price for tax credits is falling which will endanger the progress of these 
developments and their ability to move forward. There needs to be a decrease 
in tax credit prices. 
Question:  If you could make any suggestions to Congress on how to make this 
program better, what would you propose? 
 
                                                
46 This section simply reports the comments we received. We are unable to confirm or validate those with government agencies. 
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Answers: 
 In Rural States like Miss. We should be: (1) Provided more credits to fit some 
horrendous housing needs that our per capita allotment will never catch up 
with. If the credits had been properly allocated in the Go Zone, much of this 
pent up housing need for almost a century could have been addressed, 
rather than overbuilding in areas to political impact/correctness; (2) Allowed 
to use the National Non-Metro Income levels in all non-metro areas of the 
state, have about 60% of our counties permanently declared a Difficult to 
Develop Area (thereby allowing the 30% increase in credits which is essential 
in the world of low rents our State is stuck in) all; (3) The 9% and the 4% 
credits should be fixed at those rates rather than floating each month based 
on some formula. This causes all kinds of financial and technical problems. 
(4) Simplify the determination of utility allowances. 
 Need to expand or carve out at 80% of median baseline income, but without 
removing resources from what is being done at the 60% level. 
 
Question: Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
Answers: 
o In small rural states like Mississippi, if we had not had Fannie Mae 
investing in credits over the last several years, our tax credit 
development activity, as small as it was anyway, would have been 
severely limited. 
o Some of this Investor withdrawal is driven by losses they are 
incurring. However, all of these Investors are still incurring Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT), which they do not have the right to offset with 
LIHTC dollars.  
o There is presently a push of legislation to allow for tax credits to be 
used against AMT, but it has not moved through Congress yet47. If 
this law is not changed quickly, we may have a dead tax credit capital 
market into late 2009 or even 2010. This will stop the completion of all 
Go Zone credit developments that have not completed their 
syndication agreements.  
o This tax credit capital market collapse will seriously impede, if not 
stop, the completion of the Go Zone tax credit developments. 
Developments do not financially pencil out if the capital from credits is 
reduced from 15-20% below the dollars counted on when the credits 
were applied for and awarded. I understand that LA and AL are 
considering adding more credits (can only be done if basis justifies 
additional credits); HOME or CDBG funds to cover some of their 
development shortfalls. MS is not in a position to do that, meaning no 
safety net to keep the developments alive. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac need to be encouraged to get back into the 
market.  CRA needs to more encourage expansion minded banks to support 
affordable housing.  FHLB affordable housing program participation should 
be required of expansion minded banks.  State bond caps should be 
allocated to multifamily and used in the suburbs, w/ non-competitive LIHTC.  
                                                
47 Comments were solicited from builders in February 2008. At the time this report was written, the bill that the developer referred to 
(HR 5720) had passes the ways and means committee. 
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Single family bond programs can be done outside the cap.  Lenders should 
be encouraged to make smaller loans, perhaps through participation.  
Lenders with large minimums should be excluded from participation in 
affordable housing programs. 
 
Builder Developers (Who Did Not Receive a Contract) Responses  
 
Question: If you could make any suggestions to Congress on how to make this 
program better, what would you propose? 
Answers:  
 Lock in 9% tax rate instead of letting it float. This adds a variable to our pro 
formats. Change name to "Affordable Housing Tax Credits" The Affordable 
Housing Tax Credit Coalition has many more good ideas. 
 Increase the percentage of the credits; fix the interest rates at 4 and 9%. The 
floating interest rate system makes it difficult for the developer to determine 
when to "lock in" the rates. When they're low like they are right now, 
developers are hurt. The credits are determined by multiplying the 4-9% level 
by the qualified basis. The current interest level is at 7% for the 9% credits, 
which costs his business 50,000 a development (times 10 developments, 
equaling 500,000). The rates have never reached 4 or 9% and that impacts 
the amount of tax credits that they can claim. Increase the per capita 
allocation. Reinforce that not everyone needs to own a home, as evidenced 
by the recent housing market crashes. 
o Create set-asides for elderly populations. 
o Streamline the QAP process (see LA example) 
o Maintain operating subsidies (i.e. Section 8) 
o Increase the qualified basis by allowing agency fees and site work 
costs to be included. 
o Keep the program run by the states. Centralizing the program at the 
federal level would be bad -- state-to-state differences indicate that 
the program should be state-run. 
 They should eliminate the AMT (alternative minimum tax) preference item for 
corporations and individuals. 
 Congress should think of re-implementing short-term waiver of income 
restrictions, like they did immediately following the storms. For those people 
who have been displaced by the storm and now by the removal of the FEMA 
trailers, they need assistance in finding affordable housing. For this reason, 
they should waive the income restrictions. 
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Summary  
Several methodological limitations of this work should be considered when interpreting 
these results. First, the sample size is small and it does not fully represent the population – at 
best, the sample represents only 25% of the applicants after the storms. Furthermore, the 
survey was designed to compare Louisiana to Mississippi as well as to compare the results of 
credit and non-credit award winners.  The inequitable data distribution for almost all of the 
reported variables may skew results.  
 
A number of suggestions for improving the LIHTC program emerged from the open 
response data.  Those suggestions included streamlining permit office procedures, assistance 
with addressing NIMBYism and inclusive zoning, coordinating local and federal guidelines, a re-
examination of financial technicalities and a re-evaluation of area median income requirements. 
Each of these suggestions will reduce threats to builder-developer decisions to enter the LIHTC 
market and will be explored more thoroughly following the face-to-face telephone survey.  
Permit Office Process and Procedures 
 
 Permit office processes can delay or prevent low-income housing from proceeding after 
the state housing finance agencies allocated LITHCs. Projects that are allocated LIHTCs and do 
not proceed in a timely manner risk the revocation of those credits. Some localities constructed 
more barriers than others, but most localities experienced frustrations with the Army Corps of 
Engineers wetlands requirements. Additionally, the National Association of Home Builders 
(NAHB 2007) national survey indicated that building permit issues was the top issue in the 
construction process.48   
 
The permit process is extensive and complex. Figure 22 presents the permit process for 
one city because a permit process diagram for Louisiana and Mississippi could not be located 
and building permitting processes are generally across localities. Several steps in the building 
permit process are of particular interest. Specifically an examination of the data associated with 
step 7 and step 10, (building permit issuance and certificate of occupancy issuance - see Figure 
21) could be useful in determining whether or not builder-developers build after they fail to 
obtain a contract to build LIHTC developments. Credits and (Zoning Review and Approval) and 
(Building Code Review) could also reveal community receptivity to LIHTC building. 
                                                
48 NEED NAHB REPORT CITATION INFO 
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NIMBY-ism, Mixed Income Housing and Inclusive Zoning  
 
Hancock and Harrison protested against LIHTC building Rand (2006. Not in my back 
yard or NIMBYism is such an obstacle for developers of multi-family housing that the National 
Multi Housing Council (NMHC) has issued a white paper for its members entitled "Overcoming 
Opposition to Multifamily Rental Housing." The paper indicates that more than a century ago, 
the notoriously poor living conditions associated with tenement houses led not only to a 
movement to reform and improve such dwellings and eventually to a movement to prevent 
further apartment construction.  
 
Picketing outside of a construction site or protesting at a city planning meeting create 
barriers and zoning regulations prohibit high density and high rise developments. A significant 
amount of resistance to multifamily rental housing is based on lack of information i.e., many 
citizens have misperceptions or stereotypical expectations about the kinds of people who live in 
rental housing. Other perceptions are that multifamily dwellings increase traffic and parking 
problems, attract criminal activity.  
Figure 21: Permitting Process 
 
Source: (The City of Greenwhich 2008) 
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The most common regulations involve zoning and/or comprehensive land use planning. 
Opponents used restrictive building codes have made multifamily construction uneconomic; and 
zoning in particular, to secure single-family-only districts. Reducing or eliminating regulatory 
impediments may hold the greatest promise for increasing the acceptance of multifamily rental 
housing. More recently, policies to restrict, manage, or even prevent further growth from impact 
fees to “urban containment” to moratoriums. Waivers or exemptions for certain kinds of 
developments result in de facto regulation against multifamily dwellings. 
 
Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Tammany parish residents have either threatened or enacted 
moratoriums, or as in the case of Jefferson Parish, threatened a zoning change and introduced 
state legislation threatening developers with financial losses and causing them to move to less 
oppositional parishes, which usually already had a high concentration of subsidized housing. 
Moreover, HB 223, required approval of the parish governing authority before LHFA could take 
action to approve tax credits (PolicyLink p. 17). Similar local actions triggered an investigation 
by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2005 for possible fair housing violations (PolicyLink P.16, 
17). 
Inclusionary zoning refers to ordinances that require that a given share of new 
construction be people with low to moderate incomes and counters exclusionary zoning 
practices. The implementation of inclusionary zoning, which comes into play in the second step 
of the permitting process, should be conceptualized as a process or a cycle with phases or 
stages.  
 
 The inclusive zoning lifecycle model has six stages that consist of: “project approval, 
marketing requirement, selecting tenants, income certification, compliance with affordability 
requirements, enforcement and penalties, sale or transfer of inclusionary property. The 
monitoring phase and timelines assist jurisdictions with identifying areas where oversight is both 
challenging and advantageous. Chapin-Rienzo & Gómez (2004) state: 
 
 “As a beginning-to-end model, this approach provides 
jurisdictions the opportunity to proactively engage residential 
property developers at each stage of developing inclusionary 
housing. It also allows cities and counties the opportunity to 
oversee the production of affordable housing and subsequently 
monitor the compliance efforts of building owners. The strategic 
use of a regulatory agreement and an administrative manual a city 
can provide an opportunity to proactively monitor each stage of 
inclusionary housing lifecycle while also encouraging affordable 
and market rate development.”49  
 
 Implementation of a system to address inclusionary zoning may improve social 
feasibility. Leelarasamee (2003) defined social feasibility as maximized social acceptance.  
Communities’ NIMBY resistance threatens LIHTC development social feasibility.  Builders and 
developers may be deterred from entering the LIHTC market because of the lack of social 
feasibility associated with the program in general and within acute local areas.  Furthermore, 
exclusionary zoning creates a political risk that could deter LIHTC development. 
                                                
49  Chapin-Rienzo, Demetrius, and Monica Gomez. Improving Implementation of Inculsionary Housing. Student Report, Los 
Angeles: The Ralph and Goldy Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies, 2004. 
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Local, State and Federal Goals and Procedures 
 
 Developers mentioned that cumbersome FEMA and Army Corps of Engineers guidelines 
have prevented the replacement of necessary infrastructure. Without infrastructure, the city 
does not have resources to sustain redevelopment and thus, builder-developers cannot proceed 
with LIHTC construction. Burdensome government restrictions and regulations create political 
risk by adversely affecting the development market. Therefore, builder-developers may be 
deterred from entering the residential housing construction market because of the lack of 
coordination between local and federal guidelines. 
 
Credit Rate Structure and Area Median Income Requirements  
 
 Most of the developers argued that the federal government should consider locking in 
the tax credit rates at 4% and 9%.  The current floating system can significantly impact financial 
decision-making and costs the developer thousands of dollars per project.  Furthermore, some 
developers have argued that the price of tax credits could be increased to stimulate developer 
interest in the LIHTC program and to stabilize the financial feasibility of the developments. 
Leelarasamee (2003) defined financial feasibility as receiving maximum return on investment 
(ROI). Stabilized financial aspects with the LIHTC program could enhance builder-developer 
ROI, thus encouraging the affordable housing market. 
 
The LIHTC program currently serves households that make less than 60% of the area 
median income.  Respondents indicated a desire to serve households at the 80% mark without 
cutting services for the poorer households.50 There tends to be a positive association with 
individuals at this income level.  Multiple respondents discussed that this income bracket 
includes blue-collar, hard-working Americans that serve communities through their livelihood 
(i.e. teachers, firemen, policemen and nurses). One suggestion was that the federal government 
could consider re-evaluating the area median income requirements of the LIHTC program. 
                                                
50 Developers have presented this perspective.  Another point of view may consider that services to poorer households may be cut if 
the income requirements are increased to include 80% AMI.  
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Final Concluding Remarks 
 
According to studies completed by government agencies and outside researchers, the 
LIHTC program is much more costly than traditional voucher programs. LIHTC, a basic 
production program, appears to have a per unit cost between 19 percent and 44 percent higher 
than standard voucher per unit costs, dependent upon location and items like the number of 
bedrooms in a unit. One study confirmed this finding: “subsidies that result in the construction of 
additional housing will inevitably produce dwellings whose construction costs exceed their 
market values”. The average total per-unit cost of the LIHTC program far exceeds the costs of 
providing a voucher for a similar-sized unit. This difference is based on production costs.51 
Smith (2002) studied efficiency aspects of the program.  He suggested that efficiency 
could be measured using any of the following: price per dollar of credit, intermediary costs per 
dollar of equity, soft costs per apartment, total development cost per apartment, number of 
financing sources, credit per apartment, rent “buy-down” relative to market and mature, deep 
delivery infrastructure.52 
Several metrics also have been suggested by program stakeholders to best measure 
indicators of effectiveness  Suggestions included: longevity, cumulative apartments financed, 
percentage national utilizations, range of property types used, combinability with many 
programs, market share of properties financed, correlation with housing needs, evolution since 
inception, flexibility, compliance performance stakeholder consensus and support and 
successor program imitation.53 
Focus on performance has been reinforced by the President’s Management Agenda and 
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. As part of the initiatives, the Office of 
Management and Budget uses the Program Assessment and Rating Tool (PART) to evaluate 
program design, implementation, results and areas needing improvement. Overall ratings 
include “results not demonstrated”, “ineffective,” “adequate,” “moderately effective” and 
“effective.”54 
 
 The PART method does not officially evaluate the keystone policy of this report, the 
LIHTC program. It is not evident that there are mutually agreed upon indicators for the LIHTC 
program. Programs without mutually agreed upon performance measures with the OMB are 
given overall ratings of “results not demonstrated.” Future policy analyses could encourage the 
OMB to evaluate the LIHTC program with the PART tool.   
                                                
51 Smith, David A. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Effectiveness and Efficiency: A Presentation of the Issues. Recapitalization 
Advisors, INC, 2002. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54  Strategysis LLC. OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). http://www.john-mercer.com/omb_part.htm (accessed March 
28, 2008). 
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The review of the literature, the data base, GIS and regression analyses, the telephone 
and area face to face interviews suggests:  
 
State housing authorities might consider the following: 
1. Using alternatives to census data to estimate amount of housing units, amount of 
housing need and per capita residency; 
2. Creating a data governance entity which would manage LIHTC distribution and 
interpretation 
3. Creating annual reports which indicate corrective actions taken in response to 
audit/oversight entity recommendations;  
4. Providing incentives to local officials for streamlining their permit office procedures; 
and 
 
Federal housing authorities might consider the following: 
5. Using permit office archival data (permit applications and certificates of occupancy) to 
determine whether developers build affordable housing without LIHTCs. 
6. Coordinating local, state and federal goals and procedures  
7. Providing incentives to both state and local officials which to help them reduce 
NIMBYism, increase mixed income developments and increase the utilize of inclusive 
zoning; and; 
8. Using the OMB-PART program evaluation methodology to evaluate the LIHTC program 
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Face to Face Field Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency 
Program
 Positives
Program
 Challenges
Interesting Point of View
Solutions
Respondent 4
New O
rleans, LA
It is easy for developers to obtain 
LIHTC's in this area. 
LIHTC is the greatest tool to encourage 
the developm
ent of affordable housing. 
The pros of LIHTC is that m
arket can  
push inventors to buy it. 
LIHTC approved for Orleans Parish not 
related to what they lost;
Harder for nonprofit developers to score 
high on the QAP;
Agencies were understaffed when GO 
Zone applications cam
e in so they called 
in people from
 across the country to score 
the apps - resulted in identical apps 
receiving different scores;
Allocation of tax credits is not equal to the 
destruction
-The problem
 is how long inventors can 
have interest in LIHTC
QAP is hard in cases of difficult projects 
and existing building renovations; 
-Voices of public housing have difficulties 
in reaching the governm
ent;
-Allocation and approval process is not as 
clear as hoped;
-Constant checking for the m
ost recent 
version of the QAP on website; It is up to 
developers to find out the newest version; 
if they do not check website on tim
e, 
changes can be m
issed, invalidating the 
application;
-The self-score checking and its accurate 
The m
arket is poor right now and that is why investors are involved right 
now. 
Could Federal Flood Insurance legislation be enacted?
Non-Profit developers really only active risk-takers in renovating old 
buildings, schools, etc.; No adaptive reuse of buildings;
National credit allocation by population m
ay not be the best m
ethod;
The "public hearing" was prohibitive - one workshop per application, 
changed from
 one year to the next, receive 10 points for attending the 
workshop;
Developers cannot create the afforable housing without the tax credits 
from
 the governm
ent in this area because of high insurance rates and high 
cost of construction.
W
hat about the land the city has reclaim
ed…
can that 
be used?
7000 units on the governm
ent rolls prestorm
;
There really is no com
prehensive strategy to 
redevelop those properties purchased through the 
road hom
e program
;
Need a real strategy for federal resources;
Need to consider the poverty rate and num
ber of 
poverty households in LA
Respondent 5
Chalm
ette, LA
Low percentage of renters in the parish;
M
ost residents are hom
eowners;
Rebuilding proceeding without credits;
Repopulation ahead of schedule;
The parish prides them
selves on being a 
non-racially divisive and safe com
m
unity;
The parish population associates drugs and 
crim
e with low-incom
e housing;
Priority is to rebuild infrastructure;
Developers were seen as con-artists;        
HUD/FEM
A Funding cam
e after people 
began them
selves;
W
on't use credits because they would be 
forced to FEM
A elevation guidelines;
Infrastructure cannot support population;
"Don't need LIHTCs because we're a very close-knit com
m
unity;"
Geography (large percentage of wetlands) lim
its econom
ic developm
ent 
m
eaning m
ost residents work for the parish governm
ent, in local industry 
or in NO;
Parish needs infrastructure;
Parish has low percentage of renters and does not have a large affordable 
housing need.
There should be no targeted areas - all areas are in need:
-There were no rentals here before the storm
. 
Can extrapolate they they would take aid not tied to 
FEM
A elevation guidelines
Respondent 6
New O
rleans, LA
M
ight be m
ore successful if there was 
less lobbying/social engineering.
LIHTC is m
ost effective: private sector 
can involve the system
LIHTC Program
 was not well publicized
Residents were told to use local agencies 
as a last resort.
Costly insurance;
NIM
BY-ism
.
M
ixed incom
e units are im
possible to 
com
plete.
Two problem
s with the m
arket:
-Increasing credit pool drives down price 
for investors
-Perceptions from
 investors - com
fort 
level;
Costs approxim
ately $30,000 to do an 
application;
It takes significant cost and tim
e for 
applying.
5000 units of those destroyed, already scheduled for dem
olition prior to 
the storm
;
All of the properties purchased by the Road Hom
e program
 are costing 
m
ore m
oney than originally thought because the grass has to be cut, etc.;
-W
ould be cheaper to sell off the properties to be rehabbed;
No one wants to build affordable housing without credit.
Governm
ent need to consider that the m
arket reality is not norm
al
Governm
ent need to consider m
arket reaction tim
e
"There needs to be a com
m
ercial incentive along with 
the credits to encourage infrastructure;"
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Agency 
Program
 Positives
Program
 Challenges
Interesting Point of View
Solutions
Respondent 7
Jefferson Parish, LA
Rebuilding is happening, but slowly;
Benefits from
 Katrina:
-Better com
m
unication between parishes;
-Better cooperation between parishes;
-Better school system
s;
-Clean-up of political arena;
-Better law enforcem
ent;
-Better building codes;
-Better com
m
unication channel between 
parishes.
Needs assessm
ent was part of the 
recovery.
Insurance costs are too high (ins. 
com
panies left the state);
Lack of Education;
Lack of Health &
 M
ental Health Care;
Lack of key com
m
erce for quite som
e 
tim
e (e.g. stocked grocery stores);
Had to cope with evacuees from
 New 
Orleans;
No public knowledge of LIHTC program
s; 
no com
m
unication about tax credit 
awards;
GO Zone initiatives were not highly 
publicized;
Lack of education for builders and 
applicants;
Lack of collaboration; 
Lack of skilled workforce;
Lack of health care system
.
The parish was overcrowded after the hurricane and thus interested in 
recovery first, not developm
ent;
Hard to incent developm
ent because perm
it fees already low;
Had to cope with evacuees - m
ost areas had to deal with low, not high 
populations;
HUD funds were ordered to be the "last resort;"
Hurricanes were unprecedented, overwhelm
ed planning and recovery 
resources and regional m
ental health;
People had to exhaust their SBA funds before the agency could assist with 
recovery efforts.
There is com
petition between low-incom
e housing and housing for the 
general public. 
-Housing policy appears to be "unfolding" in the area.
Zoning/housing/planning needs to be worked at the 
local level;
Need "inclusionary zoning" like Florida;
Before the storm
, there was no regional planning - 
now there is.
M
ore residents need to consider hom
eownership; 
-Should be encouraged by the federal governm
ent for 
express disaster concerns.
Respondent 8
Bay St. Louis, M
S
Recently constructed first grocery store; 
previously just had W
algreens.
NIM
BY-ism
 preventing any units from
 
being constructed;
Cannot house workforce so even wealthy 
people having rebuilding trouble;
"NO TAX CREDIT PROJECT HAS 
GOTTEN OFF DEAD CENTER"
All tax credit allocations seem
 to 
disappear after a public notice is issued;
NIM
BYism
 to resist the developm
ent of 
low incom
e housing in their 
neighborhood;
No
program
education
fordevelopers
Provided diagram
 of LIHTCs being prevented;
Com
m
unity would rather have m
arina than house workforce even though 
there is a need for the "backbone of the workforce;"
People want grocery stores, but store owners want to build near m
ore 
people, and not in locations where perm
it denial is taking place;
After Katrina, crim
e is undesirable and density of city was increased
<No Responses Given>
Respondent 9
Biloxi, M
S
People being priced-out and stereotyped 
out of returning to the area.
W
ages no longer com
m
ensurate with 
rents in area.
W
orkers can't find an affordable place to 
live.
Allocation ≠ availability;
W
orkforce ≠ affordable;
W
orkforce ≠ disabled;
Disconnect between LIHTC credit 
allocation and unit production;
Insurance costs are an issue;
Lack of reliable data;
Casinos are an issue (i.e. where do 
em
ployees live?);
NIM
BY-ism
 stereotype has prevented any 
LIHTC units in southern M
S;
FEM
A deadlines loom
ing but no low-
incom
e housing ready to m
ove into;
Zero ADA accessible units - zero 
certificates of occupancy have been 
issued;
Environm
ental Protectionism
 (wetland 
m
aintenance is an issue);
W
orkforce housing during construction is 
real barrier for developm
ent;
Lack of com
bined data in FEM
A;
Disabled, retired people cannot have a 
chance to have a house;
M
issing the big picture of the federal 
governm
ent (i.e. disconnect);
M
edia presents negative im
age of low-
incom
e housing.
Term
inology no longer m
eans what it used to:
-"W
orkforce housing" in not "low-incom
e housing";
-"W
orkforce housing" is not "affordable housing";
-"Allocation" does not equal "availability" - there are no units available;
-W
ages are not com
m
ensurate with rents;
-The term
 workforce housing reduces the num
ber of people in need of 
housing;
-It does not include the elderly or hom
eless.
The business sector (i.e. casinoes) m
ust work with the LIHTC program
:
-Casinos were online first after the storm
 - som
e negative sentim
ent about 
this.
-Casinos/Gulf Coast businesses should support the building of these units 
so their workers can have a place to live;
-There are no living wages here.
Hired a PR expert to com
bat NIM
BYism
;
Trust is essential for dealing with local governm
ents;
Cross-sector collaboration (public-private-nonprofit) 
partnerships will be im
portant to m
ove forward;
Doing a public awareness cam
paign;
Public awareness cam
paign using PR or M
edia would 
be needed.
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Program
 Positives
Program
 Challenges
Interesting Point of View
Solutions
Respondent 10
Biloxi, M
S
M
S Governm
ent was concerned about 
releasing funds to local housing 
authorities.
M
oney would've been better served if it 
had com
e straight from
 HUD.
Too m
any strings attached to CDBG 
funds.
Tax credit syndicators have been very 
supportive.
 NIM
BYism
Som
etim
es, the federal level policies did 
not consider the regional characteristics; 
Biloxi has diverse incom
e and sm
all 
population so that m
ixed dem
ographic 
characteristics is considered.
235 units will be done by 12/31/2007.
76 units already done.
Social security recipients are raising the AM
I, but one couple together do 
not qualify for affordable housing;
Social security concern is raising
 there are som
e m
isconceptions; 
- Everybody affected by storm
; it is m
isconception that only low-incom
e 
people were affected by storm
; 
- M
iddle and high class also are affected; 
- Katrina had affected on totally the m
arket situation
Huge dem
and for worker housing: statistics cannot reflect the reality 
because of lack of reliable data
"This city was created by a factory owner and his 
fisherm
an all living together in harm
ony. W
hy can't it 
be like that again?"
m
ixed incom
e developm
ent is m
ore sustainable
Respondent 11
G
ulfport, M
S
The elevation certificates added 4ft. To 
the base level;
Builders have to get a surveyor and an 
engineer before they can start.
FEM
A generated federal m
aps that 
indicate how m
uch elevation builders 
have to abide by.
Data is not com
puterized and no 
distinction between regular housing and 
low incom
e housing;
Do not track Certificates of Occupancy 
(CO) whatsoever
Increases on perm
it issuance have leveled off;
<No Responses Given>
Respondent 12
Biloxi, M
S
Hom
elessness is not a part of the 
conversation. There are no em
ergency 
shelters and the Seaside M
ission is gone.
Local people need to overcom
e fear 
before anything can actually 
change/start/continue.
There is fear about governm
ent 
Problem
s include:
-Insurance costs;
-Neglect for lowest incom
e residents;
-Need to im
prove the quality of housing;
-"The plan is: there is no plan"  
-Lack of data to reflect these issues.            Even m
inorities do not want to support poor people's housing efforts.
Classism
 not racism
;
Econom
ics not racism
;
Coastal elitism
 is the m
ain problem
;
Hom
elessness will burgeon because of the housing issue. The focus has 
been on the working class (80-120%
 of AM
I) not the destitute groups;
Need should be prim
ary concern of the welfare system
.
Good idea to lower the %
 of AM
I?
Is it illegal to lobby for affordable housing?
FEM
A trailors should be replaced by seaside cottages 
(e.g. Katrina cottages) - a m
ore long-term
 solution.
Respondent 13
LA &
 M
S
<No Responses Given>
The Best Program
 is one in which both 
vouchers and credits are provided but only 
a little of each so folks don’t becom
e too 
laz y
Not im
plem
ented for the lowest incom
e folks;
Application process is far too cum
bersom
e.
<No Responses Given>
Respondent 14
Jackson, M
S
Is it a fair process??
Num
ber of perm
its issued not correlary to 
num
ber of units that will eventually be 
occupied.
LIHTC can be incentive for letting 
developers involve 
Short tim
e to prepare response to QAP;
Standards are vague;
This developer able to reapply and be 
approved for LIHTCs.
Prohibitive aspects of LIHTC application: 
tough num
ber of tasks, short tim
e to 
prepare the application, som
e vague 
standards
On som
e occasions, the lowest bidding/highest scoring contractor not 
awarded the contract.
Regional conditions need to be considered.
HUD needs to check and increase the AM
I m
ore 
frequently;
The num
bers just don't work for m
ixed-incom
e and 
the M
ississippi Hom
e Corporation does not see that;
Nobody wants to build without significant m
oney
M
ixed incom
e neighborhoods are not realistic
Respondent 15
Biloxi, M
S
Have been successful in som
e cases in 
suing for som
e low-incom
e renters who 
were "Illegally" evicted
NIM
BY-ism
 ram
pant;
Insurance costs high;
Elevation requirem
ents not reasonable nor 
are they being followed;
Biloxi has been successful because of 
“special characteristics of the com
m
unity 
and staff;"
here is a deep frustration with Jim
 
Crowism
 and historical com
m
unity 
disinvestm
ent;
M
ississippi m
ade a “poor policy choice” 
to not have a CDBG-LIHTC Piggyback 
program
;
FEM
A num
bers are m
ost reliable;
Affordable housing needs include the population with between 60-80%
 of 
AM
I;
Fast-tracking building perm
its by easing zoning 
restrictions m
ay circum
vent NIM
BY;
Need to piggyback LIHTC with CDBG;
Im
plem
ent state fair housing legislation;
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Solutions
Respondent 16
Biloxi, M
S
NIM
BYism – no authority to tell local 
communities how to approach units.
Not enough credits to go around.
LIHTC has created the most production 
of any other program: 8000 units;
in Hancock county, state fund program 
was useful.
FEM
A deadlines loom, but no low-
income housing units are ready to move 
into.
Zero ADA accessible units - zero 
certificates of occupancy have been 
issued.
LIHTC has distinguished results to 
improve the quality
-For better service, application has: 
1) score criteria, and 
2) owner criteria
LIHTC requirements have positive 
impacts on neighborhoods.
LIHTC developers are attracting quality 
investors in M
S.
Concerns for delays:
-City building sites;
-W
etlands;
-Building permits;
-NIM
BYism and fear;
-Local conflicts among entities and 
interests;
-Location issues being resolved;
-LIHTC allocation delayed in Go-Zone.
-Lack of federal funding - not enough 
credits;
-Long-term issue - fees for change;
-Federalism, relations with federal 
government;
-Lack of provision for carryover of return 
credits.
Non-zoned counties need proof of available utilities;
Lack of provision on carryover/returned credits;
For accurate allocation, we require the accurate and detail evidences on 
each self-score
Through pre-application, we can help applicants to fill out the application 
materials
M
ississippi has the lowest average income of any 
state;
The supply of housing stock does not keep up with 
the need;
Education takes up 2/3 of the state's budget, so not 
much left for anything else;
Respondent 17
Jackson, M
S
LIHTC funds create about 90%
 of the 
affordable housing market;
LIHTC is the best program he’s worked 
with.
NIM
BY-ism;
Lengthy and costly application process;
Combination of LIHTC and Section 8 
vouchers is one way to make units more 
affordable;
-The voucher program is good, but the 
vouchers pay too much when paired with a 
LIHTC development;
-There should be a minimum rent to 
encourage people to move up the ladder.
It is not cost-feasible to have rents below construction costs ( 
~$200/month)
The application process through the M
ississippi Home Corporation 
(M
HC) is cumbersome, but necessary;
Need to piggyback LIHTC with CDBG;
Raise level of LIHTC;
He focuses completing development by avoiding the 
politics and maintaining positive community 
relationships;
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Builder-Developer  
Telephone Survey  
(Non-Credit Award Winner Survey = P1.1) 
 
Hello! My name is _______________________ and I am a graduate student at The Bush 
School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and I am currently working 
on a project for the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress. Specifically, I 
am conducting a survey of developers in the Gulf Region and their experiences with the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program. 
 
The responses we collect will be used to inform the U.S. Congress about the extra LIHTC 
allocations included in the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005. Because of this, your participation 
is valuable and important. The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and no 
personal information will be revealed.  This interview should not take more than thirty minutes to 
complete.  
 
I am contacting you specifically because you are listed as the contact person for Builder-
Developer Name____________________________. 
 
P1.2 Builder-Developer ID#  _______Name___________________________________ 
P1.3 State Where Development Located (___1 = LA  and  ____2 = MS) 
P1.4 Parish / County Where Development Located  (Consult Research Code) #____ 
P1.5 Builder-Developer Type  ___1 = For Profit  ___2 = Non-Profit 
P1.6 Interviewer ID: 1=Eric, 2=Casey, 3=David, 4=Beth (Interviewer circle one number) 
 
PART II: BUILDER-DEVELOPER INVOLVEMENT WITH THE LIHTC PROGRAM 
 
First, I am going to ask you some questions about your involvement in the Program. 
 
P2.1. What was the number one reason you chose to apply for LIHTCs ? (Interviewer, please 
summarize for builder and then insert into Excel Software Program) 
 
P2.2. Prior to the Hurricanes of 2005 did you have any LIHTC developments in LA/MS? 
 
 1. = Yes   2= No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
P2.2a How many? ___________________ 
 
P2.3. Were any of your developments severely damaged by the storm? 
 
 1. = Yes   2= No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
P2.3a How many? ____________________ 
 
P2.4. How many of the units in your development(s) are back in service after the storm? 
 
_______ (Interviewer, please fill in the blank) 
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PART III: BUILDER DEVELOPER INVOLVEMENT WITH THE GO ZONE AREA 
 
P3.1. How many LIHTC GO-Zone applications did you submit in 2006?   
 
________ (Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
P3.2. How many of your LIHTC Go-Zone applications were awarded a contract in 2006? 
 ________________ (Interviewer, please fill in the blank) 
 
P3.3. Please provide the reason you believe your application(s) were not awarded a contract 
(Interviewer please insert an X next to the reason indicated by Developer). 
 
P3.3a__Did not meet threshold requirements 
P3.3b__Did not meet minimum scoring point threshold 
P3.3c__Not enough credits to fund 
P3.3d__Not eligible for tax credits due to non-compliance 
P3.3e __Other _________________________________ 
 
P3.4. For developments denied in 2006, did you reapply? 
 
 1. = Yes  2. = No (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
P3.5. Did you win a contract after you were denied in 2006? 
 
1. = Yes  2. = No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
P3.6. Please provide the reason why you believe your application(s) were not awarded a 
contract (Interviewer, please insert brief summary of narrative here). 
 
P3.7. Did you build any other type of low income rental housing in 2006? 
 
1. = Yes  2. = No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
P3.8. Did you build any private market rate rental housing at the market rate instead?  
 
1. =Yes -   2. = No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
P3.9. Have there been delays in building this low income housing development?  
 
1. = Yes  2. = No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
P3.10. Why? Please Explain (Interviewer, please summarize for builder and then insert into 
Excel Software Program)  
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PART IV: BUILDER-DEVELOPER APPLICATION AND ALLOCATION PROCESS 
 
This fall, we traveled to the region and conducted interviews with several key players in the 
program. From the information we received, we saw several reoccurring themes and would like 
to get your opinion on those now.  
 
P4.1. The state Qualified Application Process and corresponding point system used to allocate 
the additional LIHTCs given to states in the 2005 GO Zone Act was easy to understand. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
P4.2. If Disagree (≤5): Which parts of the process were more difficult? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
P4.3. The LIHTC QAP workshop for the additional LIHTCs given to states in the 2005 GO Zone 
Act was helpful in completing the application.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
P4.4. If Disagree (≤ 5): How could the workshop have been more useful? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
P4.5. The required market study for the LIHTC QAP is hard to obtain. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
P4.6. If Disagree (≤ 5): Why was the market study difficult to obtain? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
P4.7. The normal federal process of allocating LIHTCs to states on a per capita basis is the 
most effective option for this issue. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
P4.8. If Disagree (≤ 5): What would be another possible way to allocate the credits to states? 
(Interviewer, please insert brief summary of narrative here) 
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P4.9. The additional allocation of needs-based LIHTCs to states in the 2005 GO Zone Act was 
well distributed. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
P4.10. If Disagree (≤ 5): How could they have been distributed differently? (Interviewer, please 
summarize for builder and then insert into Excel Software Program) 
 
P4.11. Have you had trouble renting your units?  
 
1. = Yes  2. = No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
P4.12. Did you have a problem finding a good insurance rate? 
 
1. =Yes   2. = No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
P4.13. If yes, please explain (Interviewer, please insert brief summary of narrative here) 
 
P4.14. What type of financing did you seek to build the developments? 
(Interviewer please insert an X next to the type of funding indicated by Developer). 
 
P4.14a__Section 515 Loan 
P4.14b__CDBG Funding 
P4.14c__HOME Funds 
P4.14d__FHA Loan 
P4.14e__HOPE VI Funds 
P4.14f __Other _________________________________ 
 
PART V FINAL BUILDER-DEVELOPER THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
In closing we would appreciate it if you would add any important dimensions that we have 
overlooked or expand upon anything you have previously touched upon by answering these last 
few questions. 
 
P5.1. Is there anything you would like to tell me to help me better understand the benefits and 
challenges associated with contracting with LIHTC program or the GO-ZONE Act? (Interviewer, 
please summarize for Developer then insert summary in Excel Software Program). 
 
P5.2. If you could make any suggestions to Congress on how to make this program better, what 
would you propose? (Interviewer, please summarize for Developer then insert summary in Excel 
Software Program). 
 
P5.3. In closing, is there anything else you would like to tell me? (Interviewer, please summarize 
for Developer then insert summary in Excel Software Program) 
We sincerely appreciate the time you took to complete the survey. 
Thank you! 
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Builder-Developer 
Telephone Survey 
(Credit Award Winner Survey = Q1.1) 
 
Hello! My name is _______________________ and I am a graduate student at The Bush 
School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and I am currently working 
on a project for the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress. Specifically, I 
am conducting a survey of developers in the Gulf Region and their experiences with the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program. 
 
The responses we collect will be used to inform the U.S. Congress about the extra LIHTC 
allocations included in the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005. Because of this, your participation 
is valuable and important. The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and no 
personal information will be revealed.  This interview should not take more than thirty minutes to 
complete.  
 
I am contacting you specifically because you are listed as the contact person for Builder-
Developer Name____________________________. 
 
Q1.2 Builder-Developer ID# :__________ Name _______________________________ 
Q1.3 State Where Development Located: ___1 = LA  and  ____2 = MS) 
Q1.4 Parish / County Where Development Located: Consult Research Code # :_____  
Q1.5 Builder-Developer Type:  ___1 = For Profit  ___2 = Non-Profit 
Q1.6 Interviewer ID :(1=Eric, 2=Casey, 3=David, 4=Beth (Interviewer circle one number) 
 
PART II: BUILDER-DEVELOPER INVOLVEMENT WITH THE LIHTC PROGRAM 
 
First, I am going to ask you some questions about your involvement in the Program. 
 
Q2.1. What was the number one reason you chose to enter the LIHTC development market? 
(Interviewer, please summarize for builder and then insert into Excel Software Program) 
 
Q2.2. Prior to the Hurricanes of 2005 did you have any LIHTC developments in LA/MS? 
 
 1. = Yes   2= No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
Q2.2a How many? ___________________ 
 
Q2.3. Were any of your developments severely damaged by the storm? 
 
 1. = Yes   2= No  (Interviewer, please circle number) 
Q2.3a How many? ____________________ 
 
Q2.4. Of those developments, how many are placed in service today? 
________ (Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
Q2.5. Also, in those developments how many units are currently placed in service? 
________(Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
Q2.6. What type of financing do you obtain in order to pay for your developments?  
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(Interviewer please insert an X next to the type of funding indicated by Developer). 
 
Q2.6a__Section 515 Loan 
Q2.6b__CDBG Funding 
Q2.6c__HOME Funds 
Q2.6d__FHA Loan 
Q2.6e__HOPE VI Funds 
Q2.6f __Other _________________________________ 
 
 
PART III:BUILDER DEVELOPER INVOLVEMENT WITH THE LIHTC-GO ZONE AREA 
 
Q3.1. Prior to the storm, how many units were placed in service within your developments 
located in the area now called the GO Zone? 
_______ (Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
Q3.2. How many LIHTC Go-Zone applications did you submit in 2006 under the GO Zone Act? 
________ (Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
Q3.3. How many of these LIHTC Go-Zone applications received a contract in 2006? 
________ (Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
Q3.4. Of those not awarded a contract, specify the reason below by inserting an ‘X’:  
 
3.4a__Did not meet threshold requirements 
3.4b__Did not meet minimum scoring point threshold 
3.4c__Not enough credits to fund 
3.4d__Not eligible for tax credits due to non-compliance 
3.4e__Other _________________________________ 
 
Q3.5. For development(s) that were initially denied, did you reapply in the next cycle? 
  
1. Yes  2. No (Interviewer, please circle number) 
 
Q3.6. And how many of these reapplications were subsequently awarded a contract? 
_______ (Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
Q3.7. Why was your re-application awarded a contract but your original was not?  
(Interviewer, please summarize for builder and then insert into Excel Software Program) 
  
Q3.8. Of the developments awarded a contract in 2006, how many were subsequently awarded 
Certificates of Occupancy? 
 
_______ (Interviewer, please insert a number) 
 
Q3.9. Of the developments awarded Certificates of Occupancy, what percentage of renters are 
less than 60% of the area median income? 
 
______%  (Interviewer, please a number here) 
 
79 
 
Q3.10. What reasons would you cite as the cause of any delays you may have experienced in 
the building process? (Interviewer, please summarize for Developer then insert summary in 
Excel Software Program) 
  
Q3.11. Why did chose the parish/county that you did? (Interviewer, please summarize for 
Developer then insert summary in Excel Software Program) 
 
 
PART IV: BUILDER-DEVELOPER APPLICATION AND ALLOCATION PROCESS 
 
Now I would like to ask you some questions regarding your level of satisfaction with the LIHTC 
program in general. This fall, we traveled to the region and conducted interviews with several 
key players in the program. From the information we received, we saw several reoccurring 
themes and would like to get your opinion on those now.  
 
Q4.1. The required market study for the LIHTC QAP is hard to obtain. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.2. If Disagree (≤ 5): Why was the market study hard to obtain?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q4.3. The LIHTC QAP workshop for the additional LIHTCs given to states in the 2005 GO Zone 
Act was helpful in completing the application.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.4. If Disagree (≤5):  How could the workshop have been more useful?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q4.5. The permits required to start building were obtained easily. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.6. If Disagree (≤ 5): What made this process more difficult?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Q4.7. The state Qualified Allocation Plan and corresponding point system used to allocate the 
additional LIHTCs given to states in the 2005 GO Zone Act was easy to understand. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.8. If Disagree (≤ 5):  Which parts of the plan were more difficult?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q4.9. The normal federal process of allocating LIHTCs to states on a per capita basis is the 
most effective option for this issue. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.10. If Disagree (≤ 5): What would be another possible way to allocate the credits to states? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Q4.11. The additional allocation of needs-based LIHTCs to states in the 2005 GO Zone Act was 
well distributed. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.12 If you disagree (indicated ≤ 5): How could they have been distributed differently? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q4.13. A public notice and meeting were held in the communities where my proposed 
developments are located at which I was fairly represented.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.14.If Disagree (≤ 5): Why do you feel you were you not fairly represented?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Q4.15. The communities where my developments are located were receptive to LIHTC units 
being placed in their neighborhoods.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Strongly Disagree                Strongly Agree 
 
Q4.16. If Disagree (≤ 5): Why do you think they are not receptive?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
PART V BUILDER-DEVELOPER FINAL THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS  
 
In closing we would appreciate it if you would add any important dimensions that we have 
overlooked or expand upon anything you have previously touched upon by answering these last 
few questions. 
 
Q5.1. Is there anything you would like to tell me to help me better understand the benefits and 
challenges associated with contracting with LIHTC program or the GO-ZONE Act? (Interviewer, 
please summarize for builder and then insert into Excel Software Program) 
 
 
Q5.2. If you could make any suggestions to Congress on how to make this program better, what 
would you propose? (Interviewer, please summarize for builder and then insert into Excel 
Software Program) 
 
 
Q5.3. In closing, is there anything else you would like to tell me? (Interviewer, please 
summarize for builder and then insert into Excel Software Program) 
 
 
 
We sincerely appreciate the time you took to complete the survey. 
Thank you! 
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Telephone Survey Data 
Number of Damaged Units in Service Today 
 
 Builders and developers in the Gulf Region have began reconstructing damaged LIHTC 
units.  Mississippi recipients of LIHTC credits appear to have made more progress than 
Louisiana recipients, but this finding may be misleading because the respondents from 
Mississippi outnumber respondents from Louisiana (see Table C1).  It also appears that non-
credit award winners have repaired more damaged units than credit award winners.  This 
finding may also be misleading because of the small non-credit award winner sample size; a 
more complete sample may reveal a different finding.  
 
Table C1: Number of Damaged Units in Service Today 
 Louisiana Mississippi Total Mean Respondents 
Credit Award Winner 300 557 5313 531.3 10 
Non-LIHTC Award winner - 3004 6008 3004 2 
P2.4. How many of the units in your development(s) are back in service after the storm? 
Q2.5. Also, in those developments how many units are currently placed in service?  
 
 
 
Type of Financing Used in Construction 
 
 Builders and developers in the Gulf Region have used a variety of financing for 
construction either in addition to or in lieu of the LIHTC credit.  LIHTC contractors appear to 
have used more types of financing than non-credit award winners, ranging from Section 515 
loans, CDBG funding, HOME funds, FHA loans, and HOPE VI funds.  The prevailing type of 
financing for both credit award winners and non-credit award winners falls in the “other” 
category.  The most common type of “other” financing included conventional bank loans or 
mortages. 
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Table C2: Type of Financing Used in Construction  
 515 Loan 
CBDG 
Funding 
Home 
Funds FHA Loan
Hope VI 
Funds Other 
Credit Award 
Winner       
Count 5 4 5 3 3 11 
Percentage 16.10% 12.90% 16.10% 9.70% 9.70% 35.50%
       
Non-Credit 
Award Winner             
Count 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Percentage 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
P4.14. What type of financing did you seek to build the developments? 
a. Section 515 Loan 
b. CDBG Funding  
c. HOME Funds 
d. FHA Loan  
e. HOPE VI Funds 
f. Other 
Q2.6. What type of financing do you obtain in order to pay for your developments?  
 a. Section 515 Loan 
b. CDBG Funding  
c. HOME Funds 
d. FHA Loan  
e. HOPE VI Funds 
f. Other 
 
Number of Applications Submitted 
 
 The total number of applications submitted differed between credit award winners and 
non-credit award winners in Mississippi.  Two respondents reported they have ‘0’ application 
submittted for 2006 LIHTC: one is a credit award winner in Mississippi and another is a credit 
award winner in Louisiana. However, it should be interpreted as ‘1’ because they had 
applications in the 2006 application pools. Including these adjusted numbers, the total number 
of application in Mississippi was 70 among 15 respondents. Respondent in Louisiana was only 
one person who is a credit award winner. The total number of applications submitted by credit 
award winner was 55. Data for non-credit award winner is unavailable for Louisiana.  
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Table C3: Total Number of Applications Submitted 
 Louisiana Mississippi Respondents   
Credit Award Winner 1 54 12   
Non-Credit Award Winner - 16 4   
P3.1. How many LIHTC GO-Zone applications did you submit in 2006?  
Q3.2. How many LIHTC Go-Zone applications did you submit in 2006 
under the GO Zone Act? 
 
Opinions About the LIHTC Application Process 
 
 Several survey questions sought opinions regarding the LIHTC application process.  
Credit award winners and non-credit award winners in Mississippi rated the application process 
similar (see Table C4).  These builders and developers felt moderately strong (8-8.18 rating out 
of 10) that the QAP was easy to understand and moderate (6.5-7.33 rating out of 10) that the 
QAP workshop was helpful.  Mississippi credit award winners rated the market study as more 
difficult to obtain than non-credit award winners in the state (3.83 versus 1.5 rating out of 10).  
 
 Additionally, Mississippi credit award winners rated the application process higher than 
Louisiana credit award winners.  The largest difference in ratings concerned the helpfulness of 
the QAP workshops. Mississippi credit award winners looked upon the helpfulness of the 
workshops more favorably than Louisiana credit award winners (7.33 versus 3 rating out of 10).  
Likewise, Mississippi credit award winners felt more strong that the QAP was easy to 
understand than Louisiana credit award winners (8.18 versus 4 rating out of 10).  Credit award 
winners in both states rated the ease of obtaining the market study similarly (3-3.9 rating out of 
10). 
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Table C4: Opinions About the LIHTC Application Process 
       
  QAP was Easy to Understand     
   Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents  
  Credit Award Winner 4 8.18 7.83 12  
  Non-Credit Award Winner - 8 8 4  
  
P4.1. / Q4.7. The state Qualified Allocation Plan and corresponding point system used to allocate the 
additional LIHTCs given to states in the 2005 GO Zone Act was easy to understand.  (1- Strongly 
disagree / 10- Strongly agree) 
        
  QAP Workshop was Helpful    
   Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents  
  Credit Award Winner 3 7.72 7.33 12  
  Non-Credit Award Winner - 6.5 6.5 4  
  
P4.3. / Q4.3. The LIHTC QAP workshop for the additional LIHTCs given to states in the 2005 GO 
Zone Act was helpful in completing the application. (1- Strongly disagree / 10- Strongly agree) 
        
  Market Study was Hard to Obtain   
   Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents  
  Credit Award Winner 3 3.9 3.83 12  
  Non-Credit Award Winner - 1.5 1.5 4  
  
P4.5. / Q4.1. The required market study for the LIHTC QAP is hard to obtain. (1- Strongly disagree / 
10- Strongly agree) 
              
 
Opinions About the LIHTC Allocation Process 
 
 Several survey questions sought opinions regarding the LIHTC allocation process.  
Similar to the ratings associated with the application process, Mississippi credit award winners 
and non-credit award winners felt similarly about the LIHTC allocation process (see Table C5). 
Mississippi credit award winners and non-credit award winners felt moderately strong that the 
per-capita allocations are the most effective option for affordable housing policy (7.09-8 rating 
out of 10) and moderately agreed that the GO-Zone LIHTC credits were well-distributed (6.63-
6.67 rating out of 10).   Additionally, Louisiana credit award winners felt more strongly that 
the per-capita basis is the most effective policy option and that the GO Zone credits were well-
distributed than Mississippi credit award winners.   
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Table C5: Opinions About the LIHTC Allocation Process 
               
  Allocating on Per Capita Basis is Most Effective Option  
   Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents  
  Credit Award Winner 10 7.09 7.33 12  
  Non-Credit Award Winner - 8 8 4  
  
P4.7. / Q4.9. The normal federal process of allocating LIHTCs to states on a per capita basis is 
the most effective option for this issue. (1- Strongly disagree / 10- Strongly agree)  
        
  GO Zone Credits were Well-Distributed   
   Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents  
  Credit Award Winner 9 6.63 6.83 12  
  Non-Credit Award Winner - 6.67 6.67 3  
  
P4.9. / Q4.11. The additional allocation of needs-based LIHTCs to states in the 2005 GO Zone 
Act was well distributed. (1- Strongly disagree / 10- Strongly agree)  
               
 
Reasons For Not Receiving a Contract 
 
 Non-credit award winners were asked why they were not awarded LIHTC credits.  Three 
responses were collected, which were spilt between not meeting the minimum scoring point 
threshold, the housing finance agency not having enough credits and “other.”   
 
Table C6: Reasons for Not Receiving a Contract   
Reasons Not Awarded Number  Percentage 
Did not meet threshold requirements 0 0% 
Did not meet minimum scoring point threshold  1 33.30% 
Not enough credits to fund 1 33.30% 
Not eligible for tax credits due to non-compliance 0 0% 
Other  1 33.30% 
Total  3 100% 
P3.3. Please provide the reason you believe your application(s) were not awarded a contract 
(Interviewer please insert an X next to the reason indicated by Developer). 
a. Did not meet threshold requirements 
b. Did not meet minimum scoring point threshold 
c. Not enough credits to fund 
d. Not eligible for tax credits due to non-compliance 
e. Other 
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Community Relations 
 
 Two survey questions solicited input about community relations from LIHTC recipients 
(see Table C7).  First, respondents were asked if a public notice and meeting were held at 
which they were fairly represented.  Louisiana credit award winners felt more strongly than 
Mississippi credit award winners that they were fairly represented if a public notice and meeting 
were held (7.82 versus 10 rating out of 10). Second, credit award winners were asked if the 
community was receptive to the LIHTC developments.  Louisiana credit award winners felt less 
strong than Mississippi credit award winners that the communities were receptive.  This 
information may have limited generalized applicability because of the small number of Louisiana 
respondents. 
Table C7: Community Relations 
     
 Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents
Fair Representation in Public 
Notice and Meeting 10 7.82 8 12 
Community was Receptive 5 7.64 7.42 12 
Q4.13. A public notice and meeting were held in the communities where my proposed developments are 
located at which I was fairly represented. (1- Strongly disagree / 10- Strongly agree) 
Q4.15. The communities where my developments are located were receptive to LIHTC units being placed 
in their neighborhoods.  (1- Strongly disagree / 10- Strongly agree) 
 
Permitting Process 
 
 Credit award winners were asked if requisite permits were easy to obtain.  Mississippi 
credit award winners moderately agreed that the permits were easy to obtain (6.5 rating out of 
10), while the Louisiana respondent felt moderately strong that permits were not easy to obtain 
(2 rating out of 10).  The difference in ratings between the states may signify that the processes 
differed significantly, but it may also be a result of the low response rate for Louisiana. 
Table C8: Permits were Easy to Obtain 
     
 Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents 
Permits were easy to obtain 2 6.5 6.09 11 
Q4.5. The permits required to start building were obtained easily. (1- Strongly disagree / 10- 
Strongly agree) 
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Non-Credit Award Winner Actions 
 
 From the limited non-credit award winner data, the telephone survey indicated that 
builders and developers that did not receive LIHTCs did not tend to build other low-income 
housing or market rate housing.   
Table C9: Non-Credit Award Winner Actions 
                
  Did Non-Credit Award Winner Build Other Low Income Housing Anyway? 
   Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents    
  Yes - 1 1 1    
  No - 3 3 3    
  P3.7. Did you build any other type of low income rental housing in 2006?   
          
  Did Non-Credit Award Winner Build Market Rate Housing?     
   Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents    
  Yes - 0 0 0    
  No - 4 4 4    
  P3.8. Did you build any private market rate rental housing at the market rate instead?    
                
 
Delays in Construction 
 
 From the limited non-credit award winner data, the telephone survey indicated that 
builders experienced delays in construction.  
Table C10: Number of Builder-Developers Citing Construction Delays 
      
 Louisiana Mississippi Total Respondents  
Yes - 3 3 3  
No - 1 1 1  
P3.9. Have there been delays in building this low income housing 
developments?  
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Narrative Answers (Q: Credit Award Winner) 
Code 
 CB#: Beth # 
 CC#: Credit award winner Casey # 
 CE#: Credit award winner Eric # 
 CD#: Credit award winner David # 
 
 
Q2.1. What was the number one reason you chose to enter the LIHTC development market? 
Important Points 
 
(CB2) They have been developing LIHTC housing since 1989. This is their main business. 
(CB4) They wanted to make money and he owned his own property, so they had the means to do it. 
(CB5) The deal looked lucrative and it was the only way to rebuild low-income housing on the Gulf 
Coast, considering insurance and construction costs. 
(CB6) To provide affordable housing to rural Mississippi 
(CC1) They are involved in the program to make a profit. 
"Which works well for everyone; [the developers] make money and [low-income populations] get 
housing." 
(CC2) "LIHTCs offer a great opportunity for profit and a great way to help the community by building 
much-needed housing." 
(CC3) "The LIHTC program helps to provide housing to the community. It is an avenue to do a 
community service while possibly making money." 
(CC4) Bottom line, [the developer] entered the market to make a profit. 
(CC6) [The developer has] “only been involved for one year.” They “got into this because [their] grant 
writer found out about the program through research. [They] mainly [renovate] existing houses, but 
[they] hope to move into the new unit market soon" 
(CC7) The developer has been involved in the LIHTC program since 1997.  
“It was a success, so [they] have continued.  [They] have exclusively developed single family 
detached homes. [They] use this avenue to help [their] clients in the community action 
agency." 
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(CD5) It is an opportunity to advance the creation and expansion of affordable housing.  Also, it's the 
least governmental government program. 
 
Q2.6. What type of financing do you obtain in order to pay for your developments?  
Q2.6f __Other _________________________________ 
Important Points 
 
(CB1) tax credits and bonds 
(CB2) Conventional construction and permanent financing 
(CB5) The developer took out a secured loan from the bank. There were problems because the bank did 
not understand the process. The developer probably wouldn't have gotten a loan if he wouldn't have 
gone the secured route. Now, his personal life is in jeopardy because the financing partner 
(Alliance) has delayed funds over 4 months. He might lose his home because of the delay. 
(CC1) The developer primarily uses commercial bank loans. 
(CC2) The developer mostly uses conventional bank loans to fund their projects. 
(CC3) The developer uses all of the funds listed above in addition to ”loan guarantees through the USDA 
and 538 money. HOME funds are the hardest to get." 
(CC4)  The developer “also utilize[s] conventional financing for [their] developments." 
(CC6) The developer receives “grants to fund [their] projects." 
(CC7) All of their developments “use conventional mortgage loans from a local bank. One development 
received an AHP grant from Home Loan bank." 
(CD5) The developer “uses each, not simultaneously, but in conjunction with LIHTCs.” 
Q3.4. Of those not awarded a contract, specify the reason below by inserting an ‘X’:  
3.4e__Other _________________________________ 
Important Points 
 
(CB2) The state housing finance agency deviated from the QAP and selected where the governor wanted 
to fund regardless of need and balance in market. 
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 (CB4) Didn't score high enough (scored 85 out of 102) 
(CB6) Outscored by other apps 
(CC1) Both of [their] “applications received enough points to be rewarded credits, but [their] second 
development was named as a winner then the credits were revoked and given to a development 
closer to the coast." 
 
Q3.7. Why was your re-application awarded a contract but your original was not?  
Important Points 
 
(CB4) Scored higher (97 instead of 85) 
(CB6) Not enough lead time on the original, also revitalization was given priority   
(CC1) "The QAP gives the Housing Corporation the right to reward and revoke credits when and 
however they please. For that reason, they reward credits closer to the coast, rather than those 
further away." 
(CC2) "Probably for the reason [the state housing finance agency] gave: not enough credits to fund." 
(CC4) The LIHTC process is “very competitive and [the developer] play[s] the game well."  
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Q3.10. What reasons would you cite as the cause of any delays you may have experienced in 
the building process? 
Important Points 
(CB1) Wetlands – “getting though the Corps of Engineers and Mississippi Department of 
Environmental Quality and receiving a wetland permit to build on the property lender - 
(no elaboration after follow -up)" 
(CB2) "Largest single problem has been the Corps of Engineers drastically increasing their 
involvement in Wetlands determinations across the state. [The state] now have high and 
dry hill sides being declared wetlands, which we have to spend more money on to pay the 
extortion like prices from the former Corps employees who for the most part as  [the 
developer] understand[s] own the mitigation banks that you have to buy credits from. The 
cost is one problem, but even more deadly is the extended process and time consumed in 
trying to get through the Corps, the Department of Marine Resources and the Mississippi 
Department of Environmental Quality.  Next would be the communities who did not what 
LIHTC housing and knowing that there are really sensitive time deadlines on completing 
same, have delayed allowing the developments to get started, waiting for them to die 
against the hard deadlines in the program. 
(CB5) The tax credit financing partner delayed funds. "Insurance rates are a killer" because of 
the "huge variables." It was also a challenge to find qualified labor for reasonable prices. 
(CB6) Fluctuations in equity pricing uncertainties in insurance and taxes 
(CC1) The developer said that the exact cause of their delays was " the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Wetland restrictions in Mississippi. All of the developable land has 
been developed and there is no more available land, yet they are still approving new 
projects for the area." 
(CC2) The developer’s “biggest problem has been dealing with the Army Corps of Engineers 
and getting approval to build on wetlands areas. That adds between 6 and 8 months to any 
deal." 
(CC3) "The price of asphalt and wood on the Gulf Coast has really held [the developer] back. 
The building material costs are really slowing [the developer] down." 
(CC4) "The low-incoming housing development process is very time-consuming. And there are 
zoning issues, NIMBY issues and annexation issues that make it even more difficult." 
(CC6) "[The developer] hasn't really had any delays." 
(CC7) "[The developer] had city issues. Since [their] development was approved, the 
requirements to receive permits are now much more extensive." 
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Q3.11. Why did chose the parish/county that you did? 
Important Points 
(CB1) Waveland – The developer “already had a presence there that was hit.”  A rural 
development property -- also the need and the waiting list. The developer has “ tenants 
that were moving back in to [their] complex that was destroyed and people hearing and 
calling about the new complex, there is now a waiting list for when the project is 
complete." 
(CB2) “The point process for competition as set out in the QAP determines where [the 
developer] appl[ies]. Points drive the lives of LIHTC developers, or at least have in the 
past when the State Housing Finance Agency adhered to the plan rather than be directed 
by the Governor. In the past when the system was honored, if [the developer] couldn’t 
score high enough to be successful, [the developer was] wasting [their] time applying. 
Now with the new mystical Carnac the Magnificent (Johnny Carson character) process 
implemented by the Governor [the developer has] no idea of what will be funded and 
what will not. It would be simpler if the Governor would just tell [the developers] where 
he wants developments and then [the developers] could save time by applying there. He is 
going to have the Agency do it that way anyway, even though they publish some type 
explanation of their actions, it boils down to doing what they want. Appealing is of no 
use, as once the credits are awarded they cannot take them back and do it correctly, 
leaving developers in a very trying situation. [Developers] understood that the money in 
the LIHTC program is to produce housing and not be used as some type empowerment 
program for incompetents, or as a political arm of the Governor’s office. This plan is 
supposed to be operated per the regulations in Section 42 of the IRC. The current program 
does not award a higher quality development and operator (critical to success in housing 
development, regardless of the real estate product delivered). Developers who build true 
low income developments with the same money quality developers develop quality 
market rate housing to be rented at low income levels are not awarded for doing more 
with the funding. Nor is there any recognition for quality operators, the backbone of 
success in affordable housing.” 
(CB5) The developer was in the market before the storm.  He owned about 200 apartment units 
and 7 shopping centers. 
(CB6) The developer built there because of the damage and because encouragement from local 
officials 
(CC1) "The QAP offered extra points for planning … development[s] in the GO Zone and 
especially, the coastal counties, so [the developer] chose to build in that area for the extra 
points." 
(CC2) The developer tends “to choose the more populated areas that will be best served by low-
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income housing." 
(CC3) The developer “chose those areas because they were the hardest hit and most in need of 
housing. As well, [developers] received extra point on your application if [they] were in 
that region." 
(CC4) The developer “built in those counties because Mississippi was focused on the Gulf 
counties and offered additional points for developments placed there." 
(CC6) "This is the county [the developer] work[s] from so [they] felt it was important to support 
[their] community." 
(CC7) The developer “actually chose to build in the county [they] did because they asked [them] 
to. Prior to the storm, the mayor of Wiggins had asked [the developer] to build some low-
income housing there. After the storm, [the developer] wanted to build there because of 
the proximity to the Gulf Coast and that would be good for evacuees." 
 
Q4.2. If Disagree (≤ 5): Why was the market study hard to obtain?  
Important Points 
 
(CB2) The market study was not hard to obtain, just hire a competent market study consultant.  
(CB6) The market study was expensive, The developer had to use an out-of-state firm 
(CC1) The developer was not sure who told the research team that the market study was "hard 
to obtain… they are expensive, but [the developer has] to put money in to make money. 
One application costs us about $40,000. [The developer] wouldn't expect to pay any less." 
(CC2) The developer has “not had any issues with obtaining the market studies." 
(CC3) The developer has “not really struggled with the cost of the market study. More or less, 
[the developer has] had issues with finding third parties that [the developers] and the 
housing agencies can trust." 
(CC4) "The market study is easy for [the developer]." 
(CC6) "The market study was actually fairly easy to obtain." 
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Q4.4. If Disagree (≤5):  How could the workshop have been more useful?  
Important Points 
 
(CB4) They're not useful to the developer because they’ve been developing for a long time. 
They attend the workshop only to see what has changed from the last QAP. They 
"reckoned" that it was helpful for new builders. It could be more helpful if the lady who 
runs the meetings was less monotone. The workshops tend to drag on and on. 
(CC1) "The workshop was helpful. However, in Mississippi, it was obvious that this was a 
learning process for Home Corporation. They were not prepared to answer all of the 
questions from attendees." 
(CC3) "You could learn as much about the application from reading it as [the developers] do at 
the workshop, but it is required, so [they] went." 
(CD5) “It wasn't helpful, but it couldn't have been.  The process is so complicated, if [the 
developer doesn’t] know the process by that time, the workshop is too little too late.” 
 
Q4.6. If Disagree (≤ 5): What made this process more difficult?  
Important Points 
 
(CB2) The difficulty “depended on the location. Some locations use the building permit process 
as a way of keeping out tax credit housing that they do not want in their community.   
Further, before [developers] can apply for the permits, [they] have to clear the Corps of 
Engineers wetlands gauntlet.” 
(CC1) The developer “had no issues getting approval from the county… [they] have had issues 
with  the Army Corp of Engineers." 
(CC4) "The building permit process is slowed by planning commissions and NIMBY issues. 
There are also usually issues of engineering. It is a very arduous process." 
(CC7) "The permit process in the city where [the developer was] building has become much 
more extensive." 
(CD5) 1. In New Orleans, the infrastructure isn't in place to return the process to pre-hurricane 
standards.  2.  FEMA Guidelines are very difficult to abide by. 
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Q4.8. If Disagree (≤ 5):  Which parts of the plan were more difficult?  
Important Points 
(CC1) "It was easy for [the developer] to complete, but [the developer thinks that] it would be 
practically impossible for a first-time applicant. It gets easier with practice." 
(CC3) "The application is always very tedious and time-consuming. But [the developer is] very 
detail-oriented and always get it done right." 
(CD5) The plan is so complex and it isn't tested over time. 
 
Q4.10. If Disagree (≤ 5): What would be another possible way to allocate the credits to states? 
Important Points 
(CB2) The housing finance agency could consider the dollar amounts and degree of housing 
needs. Louisiana and Mississippi are the poorest states with low populations, and it is 
almost impossible to get enough funding to make any significant difference in the housing 
needs. 
(CB6) Same method, but weighted for need, rural, DDA, etc. 
(CC1) "Yes, this is the most effective way. Any other way may be way too political, but maybe 
if there was some way to allocate the credits by percent of poverty." 
(CC7) "The process should depend on the need for low-income housing in each state, but [the 
developer was] not sure how that would be measurable." 
(CD5) The per capita method is very fair 
 
Q4.12 If you disagree (indicated ≤ 5): How could they have been distributed differently? 
Important Points 
(CB2) “The first round of Go Zone awards in early 2006 were distributed in a sensible and 
balanced manner. After that politics took over and massive amounts of credits were 
forced into given areas much is excess of their ability to provide qualified residents. This 
is going to result in as much as 20% or better of the total credits not producing housing 
that is needed in the state.”  
(CB4) “The first year, it was a 10. Later years, it was a 2 or 3 because the QAP forced 
developments into the Gulf Coast. This is going to cause a lot of the tax credits to expire 
because of the conflicts in the region. There was not much affordable housing before the 
storm and the land prices have shot up. The EPA and city governments are blocking the 
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process with zoning and permitting. Other communities need the housing just as bad.” 
(CB5) Some areas received too many credits. If the funding was supposed to help rebuild the 
coast, why were funds being allocated so far north? There should have been more for Pass 
Christian. 
(CB6) The additional credits should have been strung out over 5 to 6 years, with heavier 
weighting in the earlier years 
(CD5) Yes, they are distributed based on areas receiving greatest amount of damage having 
more LIHTCs 
 
Q4.14.If Disagree (≤ 5): Why do you feel you were you not fairly represented?  
Important Points 
(CB2) The current public notice process amounts to nothing more than throwing the developers 
under the bus. They are required to incite everyone in the community and take their 
attacks, insults and near assaults. If the developer can survive this without too much 
pressure being directed at the State Agency then their applications will be considered, 
assuming they are in the geographic location preferred by the States leaders. 
(CB6) The developer’s proposals were well accepted 
(CC1) "The issues were nothing more than NIMBYism issues." 
(CC7) "They heard [the developer, they were] represented. There was no opposition to [their] 
2006 build, however, the[ir] 2007 build has had a lot of opposition. In fact, [they] have 
had to hold three public hearings." 
 
Q4.16. If Disagree (≤ 5): Why do you think they are not receptive?  
Important Points 
(CB2) The developer has “been able to convince several communities that [their] proposed 
developments would be valuable assets for their communities. [The developer] 
accomplished this through many meetings with local churches and concerned citizens 
groups and with the dissemination of considerable information on what [their] 
development consisted of. This included plane trips with officials and housing opponents 
from the communities to let them see and touch [their] housing product that [the 
developer] wanted to deliver to their community. [The developer] also had to prove that 
[their] ongoing management of those homes would be a positive for their community. If 
the State Agency would require a higher standard of housing be produced, as [the 
developer has] been able to consistently do over the years, and to remove operators who 
99 
 
do not stand behind their housing developments for the required 15 years, tax credits 
would not have such a bad name and [they] would not have to go to such great links to 
prove that what [the developer does] is good for the community and not the thrash that 
they have heard all too much about.” 
(CC1) The developer “really only had one problem: in Gulfport, the local government (County 
Board of Supervisors) gave out letters to developers saying that their developments did 
not fit into the Consolidated Housing Plan for the area. They said there was no more need 
for LIHTC. In reality, they just didn't want LIHTC developments built in their area. They 
view the hurricane as an opportunity to build back for tourism, not low-income housing." 
(CC4) "They are not receptive because of socioeconomic and discrimination issues." 
(CD5) Don't know the reason, but it’s a lesson in human nature. “If they were receptive before 
the storm they were receptive after.  If they were unreceptive before the storm they were 
unreceptive after. “ 
 
Q5.1. Is there anything you would like to tell me to help me better understand the benefits and 
challenges associated with contracting with LIHTC program or the GO-ZONE Act? 
Important Points 
(CB2) Require the State Agency to fairly administer the plan rather than having it altered to 
reflect the sole directions of the Governor, which is not in the best interest of putting the 
dollars into housing in the areas needed in the Go Zone without over building in areas and 
causing problems. These dollars and the large area of the Go Zone presented an 
opportunity to make significant progress in catching up on centuries old housing needs. 
Only a portion of the good will is realized, due to not letting the housing needs be met, 
rather than a directed awarding for other purposes. 
 (CB4) "Benefit - It began in 1986 when the real estate advantage taxes were done away with. 
The government needed the LIHTCs to build affordable housing, especially because the 
population kept growing. It's also one of the few bi-partisan policies that receive so much 
support. Challenge - The program is too income restrictive. It caters to the section 8 
market (who don't have jobs), not to the low-moderate income households that need it (i.e. 
schoolteachers and policemen). " 
(CB5) It is critical to make sure that developers get a good bonding company. This can be 
accomplished only through checking into them deeply before you become involved -- ask 
for referrals. Make sure to know the contractor's work before hiring them. Otherwise, the 
developer will run into problems and have to come out of pocket to pay for them. 
(CB6) The construction start date of 12/31/07 needs to be extended historic credit 30% boost 
needs to be extended past 12/31/08 
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(CC1) The developer has “had only one problem, the Army Corps of Engineers. They need to 
relax the rules a bit if any developments are going to get built on the coast. They need to 
decide if they want to preserve what they are calling wetlands or create much-needed 
housing." 
(CC2) [The developer’s] only issues have been with the Corps of Engineers and the wetlands 
requirements. 
(CC3) "It has been hard to build a good product in the Gulfport area. There are too many 
developments planned in that area and no permits are being issued because the people are 
not receptive to the idea of low-income housing in their area. As well, the price of 
building materials makes it difficult to build a quality development." 
(CC4) "The price for tax credits is falling which will endanger the progress of these 
developments and their ability to move forward. There needs to be a decrease in tax credit 
prices." 
(CC6) "This is a very well-run and successful program. We work only with renovation so our 
developments are easier to handle." 
(CC7) "The GO Zone Act is wonderful. I like that Congress approved the consideration of the 
National Non-metropolitan Income guidelines as a possibility. [The developer] praise[s] 
the act and the IRS for their efforts in hurricane relief. Congress and the IRS looked 
forward and set a policy in case of an emergency event." 
 
Q5.2. If you could make any suggestions to Congress on how to make this program better, what 
would you propose? 
Important Points 
(CB2) Rural States like Mississippi should be: 
“1. Provided more credits to fit some horrendous housing needs that our per capita 
allotment will never catch up with. If the credits had been properly allocated in the Go 
Zone, much of this pent up housing need for almost a century could have been addressed, 
rather than overbuilding in areas to political impact/correctness; 
2. Allowed to use the National Non-Metro Income levels in all non-metro areas of the 
state, have about 60% of our counties permanently declared a Difficult to Develop Area 
(thereby allowing the 30% increase in credits which is essential in the world of low rents 
our State is stuck in) all; 
3. The 9% and the 4% credits should be fixed at those rates rather than floating each 
month based on some formula. This causes all kinds of financial and technical problems. 
4. Simplify the determination of utility allowances. See this site for more details: 
http://www.nahbmonday.com/affhou/issues/2007-06-19.html  
5. Before publishing your report you should inquire with the: 
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a. National Association of Home Builders, Housing Credit Group for details on many 
other areas of improvement that the industry has been working for years on. The Director 
of the Housing Credit Group in DC is Carmel McGuire cmcguire@nahb.com. Wed site is:  
www.nahb.org . and 
b. Affordable Housing Tax Credit Coalition http://www.taxcreditcoalition.org, in DC. 
Contact person is Victoria Spielman vspielman@hutton.com  
c. National Council of State Housing Agencies in DC is the lead organization for all state 
housing finance agencies. They have a very studied and detailed position on LIHTC 
changes needed. Web Site is: www.ncsha.org.    
___These organizations represent large groups of builders, developers, syndicators, State 
Agencies, Investors, Lenders, Attorneys and other LITHC professionals, are very well 
organized with tremendous resources, details and extensive research on the specific 
problems within the tax credit program.  They all have detail legislative agendas they are 
pursuing on behalf of their members specific problems within the LIHTC program and 
regulations. Reviewing input from these organizations is a must before any report to 
Congress on the LIHTC program.“ 
(CB4) "Change the income restriction from 60% AMI to 80% or 100% AMI. Cater to the lower-
middle class. The problem with the lowest income, Section 8 clientele is that 90% don't 
have ‘pride in what they do.’ They don't have to ‘work for it,’ so they don't value or take 
care of their home. They tear things up and move out, taking their rent subsidy with them. 
The government housing evaluators come in and find the place torn up and expect the 
place to be fixed immediately, even though the residents were responsible for the damage. 
It's for that reason that he'll never do Section 8 housing ever again. The government needs 
to make prevent ‘working the system’ -- when Section 8 clientele have babies to get bigger 
welfare checks, etc. Elderly clientele take care of their property and are good tenants. " 
(CB5) There should have been a higher weighted average to areas that were hardest hit and have 
the most need. Pass Christian should have had more focus. 
(CB6) The needs are rural and urban.  Their suburban deals will generally work without as 
much LIHTC, but the developers will go there because it’s easier. 
(CC1) "Well, in Alabama, all of the HOPE VI credits are given out of the LIHTC pool. It would 
be better if there was two different pools, so there are more LIHTCs and less HOPE VI." 
(CC2) "Recently, they decided to limit the amount of credits that one developer can receive. 
One developer cannot get anymore than 25% of the credits in any one cycle. Although 
this makes sense, they are rejecting perfectly good applications and rewarding some that 
may not be as good just to make the process more equal. Those developments worth 
funding should be funded and those that may need some work should not be funded. 
There seems to be no rhyme or reason to which projects they do select in the end." 
(CC4) "They should award additional credits or offer more soft money through HOME loans or 
CDBG funds in order to help cover the funding gaps." 
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(CC6) "They should increase the income guidelines for renters. It is very hard to find residents 
under the current guidelines." 
(CC7) "Currently, this program is servicing mainly people in the 60% AMI or less and they 
need to be servicing the 80% or less people. Because currently, the program skims off 
those people by only a few dollars." 
(CD5) Need to expand or carve out at 80% of median baseline income, but without removing 
resources from what is being done at the 60% level. 
 
Q5.3. In closing, is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
Important Points 
(CB2) The developer “did not re-apply for denied developments because the QAP changed, and 
more importantly Governors influence on where developments would be award totally 
changed the process. [This] resulted in way more tax credit developments being jammed 
onto the coast than there are residents in the allowable income band to rent them. This 
turned into a political mess and the bad results will be on the coast from overbuilding for 
years. Also, many of the developments awarded credits in late 06 and 07 will likely not be 
built, with the credits being wasted, as they cannot be recaptured by the State and 
reallocated. This potential waste of credits is further exaggerated by the collapse of the 
credit capital markets.” 
“The developments may not have received COs yet, but they expect to obtain them soon. 
Less than 60% residents at low income levels cannot afford rents that will even pay 
operating expenses. To house lower income levels [developers] have to have some form 
of rental assistance to be able to pay [their] operating expenses. This assumes that 
[developers] will have not debt as [they] cannot make debt payments from rents this 
income segment can afford to pay on its own without rental assistance.”  
“Since early winter [developers] have experienced a collapse in the tax credit capital 
market. [They] now have Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Citicorp, GE and Argon out of the 
investing market completely.  This represents 45% of the entire US tax credit capital 
market. 
_Without the incentive to buy tax credits, the credits are worthless. This has caused a drop 
in syndication capital prices of between 15 and 20%. Further complicating this is the fact 
that the   
_In small rural states like Mississippi, if [they] had not had Fannie Mae investing in 
credits over the last several years, [their] tax credit development activity, as small as it 
was anyway, would have  been severely limited.  
_Some of this Investor withdrawal is driven by losses they are incurring. However, all of 
these Investors are still incurring Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), which they do not 
have the right to offset with LIHTC dollars.  
_There is presently a push of legislation to allow for tax credits to be used against AMT, 
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but it has not moved through Congress yet. IF this law is not changed quickly, we may 
have a dead tax credit capital market into late 2009 or even 2010. This will stop the 
completion of all Go Zone credit developments that have not completed their syndication 
agreements.  
_This tax credit capital market collapse will seriously impede, if not stop, the completion 
of the Go Zone tax credit developments. Developments do not financially pencil out if the 
capital from credits is reduced from 15-20% below the dollars counted on when the 
credits were applied for and awarded. I understand that LA and AL are considering 
adding more credits (can only be done if basis justifies additional credits), HOME or 
CDBG funds to cover some of their development shortfalls. MS is not in a position to do 
that, meaning no safety net to keep the developments alive. 
 (CB4) "The LIHTC program is the best government program and it needs to be expanded. It is 
the best deal for people in the income range. Fannie Mae has endorsed his model as being 
the best project design.” The developer provides large lots (min 80' wide), large square 
footage (min 1450, when other developments average 1320), garage, 8 floor plans, 9' 
ceilings, ceramic tile, beautiful street design (curves, not straight lines), beautiful 
subdivision, yard care, landscaping, rolled curb, underground utilities, and appraised at 
151,000... all for $600 a month. The business model is sustained by the owner’s 
investments of his own money in the program (about $3 million) because he views it as a 
long-term cash flow investment. His drive is that he has pride in his own town and he 
wants to help hard-working people. He basically encourages residents to stay in the units 
and at the end of 15 years (the amount of time required for the LIHTC program), the 
residents can buy the house at a substantially reduced price. 130% of their rent goes 
towards the P&I of the mortgage. Basically, renters can purchase the home for 60,000 
when it will be worth 150,000 (in today's $$). It will help them to get the biggest 
investment of their lives. 
(CB5) The developer’s experience was so awful that they will never do a LIHTC development 
ever again. This results mainly from his dealings with Alliance Capital, who was the 
financial investor for the development. They delayed funds 5 months, knocking the 
development off of the time schedule and increasing project costs. The developer has 
been short-changed about $100k and is seeking legal recourse. It got to the point that their 
partner was no longer returning phone class and has employed young, hot-shot lawyers. It 
is truly a “David and Goliath situation.” The developer knows of about 7-8 other deals that 
have had the same sort of problem. It's a class-action lawsuit waiting to happen. 
It's hard to know these sort of things when the developer hasn't done it before, so it's a real 
barrier to entry.  
(CB6) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac need to be encouraged to get back into the market.  CRA 
needs to more encourage expansion minded banks to support affordable housing.  FHLB 
affordable housing program participation should be required of expansion minded banks.  
State bond caps should be allocated to multifamily and used in the suburbs, w/ non-
competitive LIHTC.  Single family bond programs can be done outside the cap.  Lenders 
should be encouraged to make smaller loans, perhaps through participation.  Lenders with 
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large minimums should be excluded from participation in affordable housing programs. 
(CC1) "Help the Army Corp of Engineers to better understand why [developers] need to build 
these developments so they will be more loose on the Wetland rules,"  
(CC4) "The LIHTC program is well organized and focused at the federal level, but it gets all 
'boogered-up' at the state level because of attempted social engineering." 
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Narrative Answers (P: Non-Credit Award Winner) 
Code 
 NCB#: Non Credit award winner Beth # 
 NCC#: Non Credit award winner Casey # 
 NCE#: Non Credit award winner Eric # 
 NCD#: Non Credit award winner David # 
 
 
P2.1. What was the number one reason you chose to apply for LIHTCs? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1) The developer believes in the mission and it is less risky than market-rate development. 
(NCB3) The developer has been in the business a long time. The incentive is that the credits provide funding for 
construction costs. 
(NCC2) The developer “entered the LIHTC market after the introduction of the 20 GO Zone legislation." 
(NCC3) The developer has “been building affordable housing since the 1970's. [They] entered the LIHTC market 
when the legislation was first introduced. " 
 
P3.3. Please provide the reason you believe your application(s) were not awarded a contract 
        P3.3e __Other _________________________________ 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1) Did not score high enough per MHC 
 
P3.6. Please provide the reason why you believe your application(s) were not awarded a contract 
Important Points 
 
(NCC3) The developer “entered three reapplications and all of them were approved." 
 
P3.10. Why? Please Explain (P3.9. Have there been delays in building this low income housing developments?)  
Important Points 
 
(NCB3)  It took longer to start up because of: 
 Labor shortages 
 Material shortages 
  Expensive labor (trade workers such as plumbers, electricians, carpenters) 
  Insurance availability and cost due to uncertain conditions 
  Surveyor availability (state took all of the surveyors) 
 Flood elevation uncertainty 
 Permit offices (government response was overwhelmed and the offices were short-handed; many of their 
staff members were dealing with the flood elevation advisory issues) 
(NCC3) "The majority of [the developer’s] issues come from municipalities. Some local governments have 
infrastructure problems (for example, water and sewer) )… Also, there seems to by NIMBY issues from 
neighborhood members." 
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P4.2. If Disagree (≤5): Which parts of the process were more difficult? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB3) "He'd give LA a 4 and MS a 7. LA was a problem because of scoring inconsistencies and [a lack of 
coordination] between LHFA, LRA and Office of Community Development, who administers the CDBG 
funds. The organizations had different goals and succeeded in pushing urbanized incentives, neglecting 
the small, rural towns. LRA didn't know much about LIHTC scoring and didn't have authority, so they 
had to advise LHFA on the QAP. Institutional jealousy resulted in a garbled and inconsistent QAP. 
Institutional differences also resulted in a staffing problem. LRA and OCD paid higher salaries than 
LHFA, so the 2 organizations would ‘cherry-pick’ qualified staff. This left LHFA understaffed and ill-
equipped to walk through the scoring process. The agency was used to dealing with an $8 million dollar 
credit authority, but received a $100-200 million credit authority after the storm. LHFA simply did not 
have the human resources to administer the program effectively." 
 
 
 
P4.4. If Disagree (≤ 5): How could the workshop have been more useful? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB3) The QAP workshops are “laughable.” They exist for the housing finance agency to tell developers what 
the rules are once they're in place. Developers don't have a say in the process. The workshops could be 
improved if they had a "comprehensive comment period" to address how the rules work in practice. 
 
 
P4.6. If Disagree (≤ 5): Why was the market study difficult to obtain? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1) The developer is used to LIHTC market study requirements, so it was relatively easy to obtain. 
(NCB3) It's as simple as paying a consultant $3200-3500 and waiting for the advice. 
(NCC2) "The required market study is actually easy to obtain." 
(NCC3) "The market study is actually easy to obtain." 
 
P4.8. If Disagree (≤ 5): What would be another possible way to allocate the credits to states? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1) I can't think of a better approach. 
(NCB3) There needs to be more credits per capita, but the normal process is great otherwise. 
(NCC3) "I think it is working, but … the credits could be allocated on a need-basis rather than on a per capita 
basis. Mississippi is on the losing end of this process because they have a smaller population, but a higher 
need." 
 
P4.10. If Disagree (≤ 5): How could they have been distributed differently? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB3) The developer didn't know, but said that they should be allocated using Congressional Districts. Part of the 
problem is the point-system, not the allocation. 
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P4.13. If yes, please explain (P4.12. Did you have a problem finding a good insurance rate?) 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1)  For the developer’s Mobile, AL project, they paid a premium for builder's risk insurance. Since 2006, 
they've seen rates drop somewhat. 
(NCB3) There was a tremendous initial spike, but the rates have generally settled at about 50% higher than the pre-
hurricane level. 
(NCC3) "Initially, [builders] begin with Builders Risk insurance, but that becomes Permanent Hazard insurance. 
Builder Risk insurance is much more expensive after the storms than before the storms. [The developer is] 
expecting similar effects on Permanent Hazard insurance." 
 
P4.14. What type of financing did you seek to build the developments? 
Q2.6f __Other _________________________________ 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1) Alabama Multifamily Loan Consortium (debt) 
(NCB3) Private loans 
(NCC2) The developer has “used conventional loans to build [their] developments in Illinois." 
(NCC3) The developer uses “insurance company loans that Fannie Mae underwrites." 
 
P5.1. Is there anything you would like to tell me to help me better understand the benefits and challenges 
associated with contracting with LIHTC program or the GO-ZONE Act? 
Important Points 
 
(NCC2) "The only issues right now are the changes in the credit market and alternative minimum tax issues." 
 
P5.2. If you could make any suggestions to Congress on how to make this program better, what would you 
propose? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1) Lock in the 9% tax rate instead of letting it float. This adds a variable to the developer’s pro formats. 
Change the name to ""Affordable Housing Tax Credits" The Affordable Housing Tax Credit Coalition has 
many more good ideas. 
(NCB3) "Increase the percentage of the credits; fix the interest rates at 4 and 9%. The floating interest rate system 
makes it difficult for the developer to determine when to ‘lock in’ the rates. When they're low like they 
are right now, developers are hurt. The credits are determined by multiplying the 4-9% level by the 
qualified basis. The current interest level is at 7% for the 9% credits, which costs his business 50,000 a 
development (times 10 developments, equaling 500,000). The rates have never reached 4 or 9% and that 
impacts the amount of tax credits that they can claim. Increase the per capita allocation. Reinforce that not 
everyone needs to own a home, as evidenced by the recent housing market crashes. 
 Create set-asides for elderly populations. 
 Streamline the QAP process (see LA example) 
 Maintain operating subsidies (i.e. Section 8) 
 Increase the qualified basis by allowing agency fees and site work costs to be included. 
 Keep the program run by the states. Centralizing the program at the federal level would be bad -- 
state-to-state differences indicate that the program should be state-run." 
(NCC2) "[Congress] should eliminate the AMT (alternative minimum tax) preference item for corporations and 
individuals." 
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(NCC3) "Congress should think of re-implementing short-term waiver of income restrictions, like they did 
immediately following the storms. For those people who have been displaced by the storm and now by the 
removal of the FEMA trailers, they need assistance in finding affordable housing. For this reason, they 
should waive the income restrictions." 
 
P5.3. In closing, is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
Important Points 
 
(NCB1) LIHTC is an outstanding program. Poor families and the elderly receive beautiful housing that endures for 
many years. The developments endure because owners/developers remain accountable for many years. 
(NCB3) Developers “can get through NIMBY by talking to the local government officials before [they] apply. 
Race, class and politics factor into the decisions and you can all be saved heartache by talking about 
things before they go too far. [The developer] used to think that he could litigate the problem and he won 
a discrimination suit against St. Bernard Parish about 10 years ago, but it's better to try to work with the 
officials first. St. Bernard parish still resists affordable housing developments. A lot of the post-storm 
resistance has been centered in Jefferson Parish and New Orleans east. He won't get involved in New 
Orleans east because it is a ‘rotten market’ -- there was no levee protection before the storm and there's 
none now. Historic ‘bad management and bad residents’ make the market unattractive and invaluable. In 
all, the biggest problem is bad management, bad government and complicated policy-making. Katrina 
unearthed the problems for the world to see." 
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Spring Field Trip Survey Questionnaire 
 
Interview Prompts 
 
Exploring Issues Related to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit  
in the Gulf Opportunity Zone 
 
For these interviews, we would like to start with several general opening questions 
about the agencies and participants we are interviewing. From there, we would like to 
move to interview prompts, rather than questions. This will be general questions that will 
serve ad conversation guidelines during our interviews. Finally, we would like to wrap-
up with general closing questions. 
 
General Opening Questions 
1. What are your roles and responsibilities as related to the LIHTC program? 
2. What type of procedures and forms do you use for the program? 
 
Local Government Officials 
1. How do you communicate with builders/developers planning to create affordable 
housing in your area? 
2. What processes and procedure are involved in creating affordable housing in 
your area? 
3. How do you communicate with citizens about developments in your area? 
4. How do you communicate with the state agencies in charge of the LIHTC 
program? 
5. Has the LIHTC been successful in regenerating affordable housing after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Please explain. 
6. Have you had a positive experience with the LIHTC program? Please explain. 
 
State Monitoring Agencies 
1. Where do you gather you data about the LIHTC program in your state? 
2. What processes and procedures are involved in gathering data about the LIHTC 
program? 
3. What type of forms do you use? 
4. How do you respond to “snags” in these processes? 
5. How often does your organization meet? 
6. Would you say the LIHTC has been successful in regenerating affordable 
housing after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Please explain. 
7. Has your state had a positive experience with the LIHTC program? Please 
explain. 
 
111 
 
Data Collection Agencies 
1. How do you collect data about the LIHTC program from local entities? 
2. Where do you gather you data about the LIHTC program in your state? 
3. What processes and procedures are involved in gathering data about the LIHTC 
program? 
4. What type of forms do you use? 
5. How do you respond to “snags” in these processes? 
6. What type of process do you use to interpret that data? 
7. How do you report it to the federal authorities? 
8. Would you say the LIHTC has been successful in regenerating affordable 
housing after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Please explain. 
9. Has your state had a positive experience with the LIHTC program? Please 
explain. 
 
General Closing Questions 
1. If you could communicate one thing about this program to Congress, what would 
it be? 
2. Is there anything else you would to discuss?  
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Table 28 
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Table 29 
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Table 30 
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Figure 21 
 
Distribution of Number of Low Income Units within Census Tract
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